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INTRODUCTION
The constitutional analysis for free speech in public schools has long generated
controversy and confusion. The Supreme Court's first entry into this area, Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District, appeared to establish a speech-
protective standard.' In now famous language, the Court pronounced that "students
and teachers do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate," and held that a school could not prohibit students from wear-
ing black armbands to school to protest the Vietnam War.2 Although the Court rec-
ognized that high schools are special environments for analyzing First Amendment
* Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law. The author would like
to acknowledge Marie Marvle, class of 2007, for her very helpful research on this Article.
1 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
2 Id. at 505-06.
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rights, it stated that student speech was protected as long as it did not "materially and
substantially interfere" with school operations.3
In two subsequent decisions, however, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser4
and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,5 the Court appeared to cut back substan-
tially on the seemingly broad scope of Tinker. In Fraser the Court held that schools
could prohibit lewd speech within schools, even if the same speech might be protected
in other contexts.6 Two years later, in Hazelwood, the Court further diminished stu-
dent speech rights when it held that the First Amendment did not prohibit a school
from censoring a high school newspaper. 7 In doing so, the Court drew a sharp dis-
tinction between school toleration of student speech and school promotion of student
speech. The Court said schools could exercise much greater control over the latter,
which included production of a school newspaper, to avoid perceptions of the school's
imprimatur behind the speech.8
Fraser and Hazelwood had two effects on constitutional analysis of student
speech rights. First, as noted above, the decisions indicated that student speech rights
were not nearly as broad as suggested by Tinker, in other words, students in fact shed
many of their rights when entering the schoolhouse gate. The idea that student speech
is limited by the special characteristics of schools, mentioned in Tinker, came to the
forefront in these two decisions. Second, Fraser and Hazelwood created some con-
fusion over how to analyze student speech rights, and in particular which case-
Tinker, Fraser, or Hazelwood-should govern the typical high school speech case.
Indeed, in the nearly two decades since Hazelwood, lower courts have decided a large
number of cases involving free speech in high schools, often struggling with the
proper standard of analysis.9
At first glance, the Supreme Court's decision last term in Morse v. Frederick did
little to change those two perceptions.'0 Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion,
written in a very narrow fashion to garner a five-person majority, affirmed that schools
are special environments and not always governed by the speech-protective standard
of Tinker." It then proceeded to do little more than decide the narrow issue before it,
holding that speech in high school advocating illegal drug use is not protected by the
' Id. at 509.
4 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
5 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
6 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
7 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-73.
8 id.
9 See, e.g., Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 211-14 (3d Cir. 2001);
Muller ex rel. Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1536-38 (7th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1156 (1997); Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524,529
(9th Cir. 1992); Griggs ex rel. Griggs v. Fort Wayne Sch. Bd., 359 F. Supp. 2d 731,739-41
(N.D. Ind. 2005).
10 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
" Id. at 2626-27.
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First Amendment. 2 As such, the holding, though narrow in its scope, appeared to
further erode whatever free speech rights students might have in public high schools,
a point emphasized in both Justice Breyer's opinion concurring in the judgment and
Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion.' 3 Both opinions saw the majority endorsing
viewpoint restrictions in schools in a manner that threatened core free speech values
and further eroded student speech rights. 4
At the same time, the confined nature of the majority opinion's analysis and
holding added very little, if anything, to the Court's analytical framework in the area
of student speech, seeming to leave the law as confused as ever. 5 In particular, the
majority mostly stressed only two rather uncontroversial points, that the Tinker stan-
dard does not govern all student speech cases and that speech can at times be restricted
in schools that might be protected elsewhere. 6 It then proceeded to state that drug
advocacy falls into that later category, without providing a clear analytical standard
for reaching that conclusion. 7 This led Justice Thomas to remark in a concurring
opinion that "our jurisprudence now says that students have a right to speak in schools
except when they don't."'
8
Yet I would suggest that there is more to Morse than meets the eye, and that
Morse did not in any significant way erode student speech rights. Indeed, if anything,
when the various opinions are taken as a whole, Morse reflects a resolve to protect
student speech rights not seen in either Fraser or Hazelwood. Although the majority
opinion is remarkably limited in what it states, 19 and Justice Thomas in a concurring
opinion would eliminate student speech rights altogether,' the other opinions, repre-
senting a majority of the Court, are quite speech affirming. 2' This is especially true
of Justice Alito's critical concurring opinion, joined by Justice Kennedy, which is very
affirming of student speech rights and sends a clear message that Morse is a very lim-
22ited opinion. Moreover, despite the inevitable ambiguity in this area, and the paucity
12 Id. at 2627-29.
'3 Id. at 2639 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 2644-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'4 Id. For an early academic response also criticizing Morse as opening the door to further
content-based restrictions and further eroding student speech rights, see Joanna Nairn, Note,
Free Speech 4 Students? Morse v. Frederick and the Inculcation of Values in Schools, 43
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 239 (2008).
'" See, e.g., JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 16.28 (3d ed. 2007).
16 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626-27.
'7 Id. at 2627-29.
18 Id. at 2634 (Thomas, J., concurring).
'9 See id. at 2622-29 (majority opinion).
20 See id. at 2634 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("As originally understood, the Constitution
does not afford students a right to free speech in public schools.").
21 See id. at 2636-38 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 2638-42 (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); id. at 2642-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22 See id. at 2636-38 (Alito, J., concurring).
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of new analysis offered by Morse, the Court has provided reasonable guidelines, both
in Morse and elsewhere, for addressing the thorny issue of speech in schools.
What Morse once again makes clear, and what the Court has stated in its previous
decisions, is that the free speech rights of high school students must be analyzed in
light of the special characteristics and purpose of public high schools.23 This is neither
remarkable nor disconcerting. Schools don't exist to facilitate free speech, but rather
to educate students, and students' free speech interests must be tailored to a school's
unique environment. To a majority of the Morse Court, this meant schools can pro-
hibit speech advocating illegal use of drugs, since such speech poses a unique threat
to the physical safety of adolescents. 24 But the Court was careful to indicate that this
is a special case and does not give schools carte blanche to suppress student speech,
especially when it concerns viewpoint restrictions on core political and social issues.
Indeed, a close reading of Morse suggests that viewpoint restrictions on core speech
will certainly be subject to the Tinker standard, in which schools can prohibit speech
only when it poses a very real threat to substantially interfere with school operations
or would infringe on the rights of other students.
What emerges from Morse, especially when Justice Alito' s concurrence is con-
sidered, is a balancing test for resolving many students speech issues in school. This
test does not cover all student speech issues, such as when schools create limited public
forums or the school itself sponsors the speech in question, but it applies to the most
common types of student speech issues, where the students' speech happens to occur
at school. In such instances Morse suggests that courts should balance three concerns:
the type of restriction imposed, how central or peripheral the speech is to core First
Amendment values, and the strength of the asserted state interest. This balancing ap-
proach was arguably implicit in prior decisions and does not constitute a major re-
tooling of the student speech analysis. But it does refine and refocus the analysis to
some extent, and should clarify and change the approach taken by lower courts.
This Article will examine the scope of student speech in high schools after Morse
v. Frederick. Part I will first briefly review the Court's decisions in Tinker, Fraser,
and Hazelwood. Part 1I will then analyze the Court's decision in Morse, giving close
attention to Justice Alito's concurrence as well as the majority opinion. Part 1U1 will
then briefly summarize the status of student free speech rights after Morse.
23 Id. at 2625, 2629 (majority opinion); see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (student speech rights "must be applied in light of the special character-
istics of the school environment" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,681-86 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503,506 (1969) ("First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics
of the school environment, are available to teachers and students.").
24 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628-29; id. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring) ("[I]llegal drug use
presents a grave and in many ways unique threat to the physical safety of students. I therefore
conclude that the public schools may ban speech advocating illegal drug use.").
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Part IV will then briefly explore three special types of student speech issues that
raise distinct analytical concerns and are not directly governed by Morse, yet are im-
portant for a broader understanding of student speech in public schools. This will
include some discussion of lower court decisions in each of these categories. Part
V.A will discuss the issue of limited public forums in public schools, especially as
illustrated by the issue of student clubs. Part IV.B will examine the issue of school-
sponsored and curricular speech as developed in Hazelwood. Part IV.C will examine
the special problem of school review and approval policies for student distribution
of literature, which constitute prior restraints, a highly sensitive constitutional issue.
Finally, Part V will examine more closely the central issue of restrictions on stu-
dent speech that occur outside the public forum and school-sponsored speech context,
in other words, private student speech that happens to occur on school property. This
is the heart of school speech issues, and it is here that Morse is most relevant. This
section will examine the variety of issues lower courts have addressed, suggesting that
the Morse balancing test provides schools with the ability to impose viewpoint re-
strictions on more peripheral speech advocating alcohol and drug use, violence, and
similar speech. On the other hand, Morse indicates that core political, religious, and
social commentary speech should be given significant protection in schools. Here,
Morse suggests that speech can be restricted only when it would substantially interfere
with school activities or harm other students, the two grounds recognized in Tinker.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
The Court's first examination of high school free speech rights came in 1969 in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.25 There, several high
school and junior high students planned to wear black armbands to school to protest
the Vietnam War. School officials became aware of the protest and passed a policy
prohibiting the wearing of armbands. The students nevertheless came to school
wearing the black armbands and were suspended. The students then challenged the
suspensions as violating their First Amendment rights.26
The Supreme Court held for the students, finding that suspending them for pro-
testing the Vietnam War in a nondisruptive fashion violated their First Amendment
rights. 27 The Court began its analysis by noting that both teachers and students retain
First Amendment fights of expression, stating in a now famous passage that neither
"students [n]or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech orexpres-
sion at the schoolhouse gate. 28 The Court noted, however, that those rights must
25 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
26 Id. at 504-05.
27 Id. at 514.
28 Id. at 506.
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be analyzed "in light of the special characteristics of the school environment."29 In
particular, the Court recognized the necessary authority of school officials to control
conduct and avoid disruption of the school's educational mission." Thus, the case
presented a necessary balancing of student free speech rights on the one hand, and the
need for school officials to preserve the educational mission of the school on the other.
In resolving this balance in favor of the students, the Court emphasized two
themes. First, and given primary emphasis, the Court focused on the absence of any
facts indicating that the speech in question would disrupt normal school activities.3
It noted that the speech did not involve "disruptive action or even group demonstra-
tions," with no evidence that any class or school activity was disrupted.32 Instead,
it involved only "a silent, passive expression of opinion," which was "akin to 'pure
speech."'33 Moreover, the mere fear of possible disruption was not a sufficient basis
to prohibit speech.'
In this respect, the Court appeared in several places to indicate that student
speech activities at school are protected as long as they do not disrupt or interfere
with the school's educational mission. Thus, early in the analysis the Court stated
that "[c]ertainly" when speech would not "materially and substantially interfere" with
school operations there is no basis for discipline.35 Similarly, near the end of its
analysis it again reiterated this point, stating:
A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom
hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on
the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opin-
ions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam,
if he does so without "materially and substantially interfer[ing]
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation
of the school" and without colliding with the rights of others. But
conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason-
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior-materially
disrupts classwork or involved substantial disorder or invasion of
rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech.36
29 Id.
30 See id. at 507, 509.
31 Id. at 508-09.
32 Id. at 508.
33 id.
3 Id. ("[U] ndifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome
the right to freedom of expression.").
I d. at 509 (internal quotation marks omitted).
36 Id. at 512-13 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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Although primarily emphasizing the lack of disruption, the Court also stressed
that the school's action was made more problematic because it appeared to prohibit
only one message. Noting that students were permitted to wear political buttons and
other symbols, the Court stated the restriction singled out only one message--that of
opposition to the Vietnam War-for prohibition. 7 According to the Court, to single
out a particular message in this way was "[c]learly" unconstitutional, absent a showing
that the restricted message would substantially interfere with school functions.3" Thus,
Tinker tailored its analysis and holding to the problem of viewpoint discrimination,
saying that viewpoint restrictions on student speech are constitutionally permissible
only when necessary to avoid a substantial interference with the operation of a school
or when the speech would invade the rights of other students.
For this reason, Tinker must be understood as involving viewpoint restrictions on
core political speech, and the highly speech-protective standard that was announced
was addressed to that particular problem. To be sure, at times the Court's discussion
seemed to suggest that student speech activities are protected as long as they do not
disrupt or interfere with the school's educational mission, regardless of the type of
speech involved or the nature of the school's restriction. Yet the facts hardly require
that extensive a rule and the Court's own analysis notes the highly problematic nature
of viewpoint restrictions on political speech.
In sum, Tinker established a very speech-protective standard for student speech
rights in public schools, but one that should be understood as primarily addressed to
viewpoint restrictions on core political speech.3 9 In doing so, the Court stated that stu-
dent speech rights must be analyzed in the context of the educational needs of schools,
and, in particular, the school officials' need to maintain discipline and order.' This
special focus on educational context made it clear that even in applying a speech-
protective standard in Tinker, the Court was sensitive to the fact that schools are not
primarily designed for speech, and that normal free speech standards might need to be
modified, though not abandoned altogether, in the school context.
B. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser
The Supreme Court next addressed student speech seventeen years later in Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, in which it upheld the suspension of a student who
had given a lewd speech at a school assembly. 4' Two teachers reviewed the speech
31 Id. at 510-11.
38 Id. at 511.
39 The Court stated, "Clearly, the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at
least without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with
schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally permissible." Id.
40 Id. at 506-07, 509.
41 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986).
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in advance and warned the student that it was inappropriate and should not be deliv-
ered. The student nevertheless delivered the speech, which was filled with a number
of sexual innuendoes and graphic references. Students in the audience responded in
various ways, including "hoot[ing]" and graphic gestures by some, while others were
"bewildered and embarrassed." '42 The principal, after meeting with the student the
next day, suspended him for three days and removed him from a list of possible com-
mencement speakers.43 The student sued, alleging a violation of free speech rights.
Both the district court and court of appeals held for the student, stating that the speech
was protected under the principles recognized in Tinker."
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the speech was not protected by the
First Amendment. 45 In so holding, it affirmed that students retain free speech rights
at school, but emphasized that schools have a legitimate interest in regulating the
manner and mode of speech. In particular, the Court noted that even though students
have a right "to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools," this had to
be balanced against society's "interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially
appropriate behavior."'
Importantly, the Court also stated that student speech rights in school are not
necessarily "coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.4 This was par-
ticularly true of modes of expression, which are subject to greater regulation in schools
than other contexts. Thus, the Court indicated that the type of offensive speech pro-
tected in Cohen v. California, which involved profanity on the back of ajacket worn
in public,48 could be prohibited in a school setting.49 The Court further stated that
schools could determine that certain modes of expression are inappropriate, empha-
sizing schools' roles in educating youth as to the shared values of our culture and
appropriate means of discourse."0
On that basis, the Court had little difficulty finding the speech in question unpro-
tected. The Court noted that the speech was clearly offensive to both teachers and stu-
dents, and could even be seriously damaging to younger members of the audience.5'
More fundamental, however, the school could conclude that "vulgar speech and lewd
conduct" was inappropriate to a school setting. 2
The basic holding of Fraser, therefore, was that schools could regulate the mode
of expression, and especially that they could prohibit lewd and vulgar speech that
42 Id. at 678.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 679-80.
45 Id. at 680.
46 Id. at 681.
47 Id. at 682.
48 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
4' Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682.
'o Id. at 681.
5, Id. at 683-84.
52 Id. at 685-86.
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involved a captive audience. It also indicated that the free speech rights of students
in school are not as extensive as those of adults. At the same time, however, the Court
affirmed the basic holding of Tinker that students retain free speech rights in school,
and specifically stated that students have an "undoubted freedom to advocate un-
popular and controversial views in schools and classrooms ....,, Unlike Tinker,
however, which involved core political speech, the "lewd and indecent" speech in
Fraser was less central to First Amendment valuesm Moreover, the state had a more
substantial interest in Fraser-protection of less mature students from inappropriate
material-than the state was able to show in Tinker. Finally, the Court in Fraser
treated the restriction as a limitation on mode of expression rather than viewpoint.5
C. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
Two years after Fraser, the Court decided Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,
the third of the school speech trilogy.56 In Hazelwood, the Court addressed the issue
of school control and censorship of a student newspaper. The paper in question was
written and edited by a school journalism class and published approximately every
three weeks during the school year. The paper was primarily funded by school district
funds and was under the supervision of the faculty member who taught the journalism
class. Student articles were reviewed by both the class instructor and the principal
prior to publication.57
The case arose when the school principal, subject to his normal review, objected
to two student articles, one describing three student experiences with pregnancy and
the other discussing the impact of divorce on students.58 He was concerned that the
pregnancy article contained material inappropriate to some younger students, and that
it failed to protect the identities of the students discussed. He was also concerned
that the article on divorce did not give an opportunity for the parents described in the
article to respond. As a result, the principal ordered that the two pages containing the
articles be deleted from the paper. 9 Student staff members sued in federal court. The
district court held for the school, but the court of appeals reversed, holding for the stu-
dents. 60 The court of appeals said that the school paper was a public forum created for
" Id. at 681.
54 Id. at 685.
55 Id. at 681-82.
56 484 U.S. 260 (1988). For an analysis of Hazelwood and its immediate aftermath, see
Rosemary C. Salomone, Free Speech and School Governance in the Wake of Hazelwood,
26 GA. L. REV. 253 (1992).
5 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262-63.
58 Id. at 263.
59 Id. at 264.
60 Id. at 263-65.
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student viewpoints, and therefore could not be censored unless it was "' necessary to
avoid material and substantial interference with school work or discipline."
61
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that censorship of the student paper under
the above facts did not violate student free speech rights.62 The Court began its analysis
by recognizing that students retain free speech rights at school, but that those rights
must be applied in the special context of a school setting. As such, school officials
might be permitted to restrict speech inconsistent with a school's educational mission
that could not be restricted in other contexts.63
The Court then analyzed whether the student newspaper could be properly char-
acterized as a public forum for speech purposes, the basis of the court of appeals
decision. Since public schools do not have the attributes of traditional public forums
like streets and parks, the Court stated schools could be public forums only if dedi-
cated to that use by the school.64 The Court's examination of the role played by the
student newspaper, however, indicated that it was more properly viewed as part of
the curriculum, controlled by the school administration, rather than an intended
public forum. 65 In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the paper was
written and published as part of an academic class for which students received
credit.' Moreover, a faculty member exercised final control over every aspect of
the paper, including deciding publication dates, assigning stories, advising students
on the development of stories, and editing all articles. Additionally, all stories were
subject to final approval by the principal.67 The Court concluded that there was no
evidence that the school intended to create a public forum in which students could
write whatever they wanted, and therefore the school could control the content of
the paper in "any reasonable manner."68
In evaluating the reasonableness of the restrictions, the Court began by draw-
ing a fundamental distinction between school toleration of speech and promotion of
speech. The former concerns a student's personal expression that occurs at school,
while the latter concerns school authority over school-sponsored activities that might
be perceived "to bear the imprimatur of the school."69 The Court stated that schools
can exercise greater control over activities that promote, rather than merely tolerate,
student speech "to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is
61 Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood. Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1374 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)), rev'd, 484 U.S.
260 (1988).
62 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 276.
63 Id. at 260-67.
64 Id. at 267.
65 See id. at 262-64, 268-70.
66 Id. at 268.
67 Id. at 267-70.
6' Id. at 270.
69 Id. at 270-71.
[Vol. 17:657
MAKING SENSE OF HIGH SCHOOL SPEECH
designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be
inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker
are not erroneously attributed to the school."7° The Court then said that schools
could exercise "editorial control over the style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related
to legitimate pedagogical concerns."71 Based on this standard, the Court had little
difficulty upholding the school's actions under the circumstances of the case, finding
that the principal was reasonable in concluding that the student writers "had not suf-
ficiently mastered those portions" of the journalism class concerning controversial
topics and the need to protect the privacy of those discussed.72
Therefore, as it did in Fraser, the Court in Hazelwood drew a significant dis-
tinction from the more speech-protective approach of Tinker. Whereas in Fraser the
Court held that lewd and inappropriate speech is not protected in the special environ-
ment of a school, in Hazelwood the Court said there is a difference between schools
tolerating speech, which appeared to be governed by Tinker, and schools promoting
speech, in which student speech rights are considerably less.73 This latter category of
promoting speech concerns both curricular matters and other speech that would bear
the school's imprimatur. Restrictions on such school-sponsored speech are valid if
they are "reasonably related to legitimate pedagological concerns," an obviously def-
erential standard.7 4 This test should be applied with three concerns in mind: that stu-
dents learn appropriate lessons, that students not be exposed to materials inappropriate
to their age, and that a student's views "are not erroneously attributed to the school. 75
Exactly how Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood fit together was less than clear,
however. As noted by the Court in Morse, three general principles might be seen
as emerging from the cases when viewed together.76 First, students retain some free
speech rights in public high schools. Second, the nature of those rights are shaped by
the special characteristics of schools, and are not as extensive as those held by adults
in other contexts. Third, the Tinker "substantial interference" standard does not
govern all high school speech cases.
It was this latter point that created some confusion in the lower courts, which
struggled with which of the three cases-Tinker, Fraser, or Hazelwood-should
govern in any particular case. Certainly the most common approach taken by lower
courts was to view Tinker as establishing the general rule for student speech, and
Fraser and Hazelwood as creating exceptions to that rule. At least eight federal
70 Id. at 271.
Id. at 273.
72 See id. at 274-76.
7 Cf. id. at 272-73; Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1985).
14 Id. at 273.
" See id. at 271.
76 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007).
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courts of appeal articulated this approach, stating that Tinker would apply unless
the speech in question was vulgar and lewd, as in Fraser, or school-sponsored, as
in Hazelwood.7 This common reading was summarized by the Ninth Circuit in
Chandler v. McMinnville School District, which stated:
We have discerned three distinct areas of student speech from the
Supreme Court's school precedents: (1) vulgar, lewd, obscene,
and plainly offensive speech, (2) school-sponsored speech, and
(3) speech that falls into neither of these categories. We conclude,
as discussed below, that the standard for reviewing the suppres-
sion of vulgar, lewd, obscene and plainly offensive speech is gov-
erned by Fraser, school-sponsored speech by Hazelwood, and all
other speech by Tinker.
7 8
This was not the only interpretation of the Tinker-Fraser-Hazelwood trilogy, however.
For example, the Seventh Circuit has interpreted Hazelwood as modifying the earlier
holding of Tinker, and that, absent a school-created speech forum, restrictions are to
be judged by the "'reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns"' standard.79
Moreover, some courts have noted that Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood all seem in-
applicable to certain types of content-neutral restrictions. For example, in Nelson v.
Moline School District No. 40, the court noted that a content-neutral time, place, and
manner restriction on distributing literature in the school did not "fall neatly into any
of the three situations presented" in Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood.80 For that reason
it declined to apply any of the three cases, instead resorting to more general principles
of First Amendment law, but "heeding Tinker's admonition to consider the special
characteristics inherent in the school environment. ' 8' It was in this context of lower
court uncertainty that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Morse v. Frederick.
7 See Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 588 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
159 (2008); Bannon ex rel. Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach County, 387 F.3d 1208, 1214
(1 lth Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 811 (2005); Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393
F.3d 608, 614-15 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1062 (2005); Newsom ex rel.
Newsom v. Albemarle County Sch. Bd., 354 F.3d 249, 255-57 (4th Cir. 2003); Fleming v.
Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-l, 298 F.3d 918, 923-24 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 1110 (2003); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 211-14 (3d Cir. 2001);
Henerey ex rel. Henerey v. City of St. Charles, 200 F.3d 1128, 1131-32 (8th Cir. 1999);
Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992).
78 978 F.2d at 529 (citations omitted).
79 Muller ex rel. Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1536-38 (7th Cir.
1996) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1156 (1997).
80 725 F. Supp. 965, 971 (C.D. I11. 1989).
8' Id. at 971; see also Porter, 393 F.3d 608.
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II. MORSE V. FREDERICK
A. Facts
Morse v. Frederick arose out of a relatively simple set of facts.12 In January, 2002,
the Olympic Torch for the 2002 winter games in Salt Lake City was scheduled to pass
in front of Juneau-Douglas High School in Juneau, Alaska, during school hours. In
order to allow students to participate in this event, the school's principal, Deborah
Morse, permitted students to go outside and view the torch from both sides of the
street. This was treated as a school field trip, with teachers and administrators super-
vising the students. 3
As the torch bearers approached, several students, including Joseph Frederick,
held up a banner reading "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS." The apparent purpose of the
banner was to get themselves on national television. 5 Principal Morse, however,
interpreted the banner as "encourag[ing] illegal drug use" contrary to a school district
policy that "'prohibits any assembly or public expression that.., advocates the use
of substances that are illegal to minors ... "'86 She therefore told the students to take
the banner down. Although the other students complied with the request, Frederick
refused. As a result, Morse suspended Frederick for ten days. The District Superin-
tendent upheld the suspension, justifying it because Frederick's message "appeared
to advocate the use of illegal drugs."87
Frederick then sued both the school board and Principal Morse under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights. The federal district court
held for the defendants, holding that they had qualified immunity and that the suspen-
sion did not violate the First Amendment. 8 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that
the suspension violated Frederick's First Amendment rights. The court of appeals said
that since the case did not involve lewd speech or school promotion of speech, Tinker
should govern.89 Applying that standard, there was no indication that the banner created
a "risk of substantial disruption" of school activities, and therefore it was constitu-
tionally protected.90 The court further held that Principal Morse should have reason-
ably understood the speech was protected, and therefore she did not have qualified
immunity.91 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether Frederick's
82 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
83 Id. at 2622.
84 id.
85 Id. at 2623.
86 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Juneau School Board Policy No. 5520).
87 Id.
88 id.
89 Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
9 Id.
9' Id. at 1123-25.
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display of the banner was protected speech under the First Amendment and, if so,
whether Principal Morse had qualified immunity.92
B. Supreme Court's Analysis
The Supreme Court, in a five-person majority opinion authored by Chief Justice
Roberts, held that the school did not violate Frederick's First Amendment rights when
it suspended him for displaying the banner.93 Roberts's opinion was written quite nar-
rowly, affirming several principles from earlier decisions and then deciding only the
immediate issue before it, whether speech advocating illegal drug use is protected in
a high school setting. Roberts said such speech was not protected, emphasizing the
unique problems schools have in combating the use of illegal drugs, but giving little
guidance on how the Court's decision affected other speech issues in school. 94 The
narrow focus of the opinion might in part be explained by Roberts's desire to secure
a majority opinion. Roberts was being squeezed by Justice Thomas on the one hand,
who would eliminate student free speech rights altogether in public schools, 95 and
Justices Alito and Kennedy on the other, who expressed the need for significant student
speech rights for core political and social speech. 96 Roberts's opinion was apparently
crafted narrowly enough to get those Justices to join, despite fundamental disagree-
ments among those Justices on how much free speech students should have.
Roberts began the majority opinion by briefly discussing two preliminary matters.
First, he quickly stated that the case clearly involved an issue of school speech, even
though the speech itself did not occur on school property.97 He noted that the event
in question took place during normal school hours, was supervised by teachers and
administrators, and was treated as "an approved social event or class trip," which,
according to school district policy, was subject to district rules.98 Second, Roberts also
concluded that the principal's belief that the banner promoted illegal drug use was
reasonable. 99 Roberts acknowledged the admittedly "cryptic" nature of the message,
but observed that at least two interpretations-that the banner urged people to take
"bong hits," or at least suggested "bong hits" were good-are pro-drug messages,
while there was a "paucity of alternative meanings." 1°° The fact that Frederick said
the message was simply for the purpose of getting on television was irrelevant, since
it concerned his motive, not what the banner might communicate.'0 '
92 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624.
91 Id. at 2629.
94 Id. at 2627-29.
9 Id. at 2634 (Thomas, J., concurring).
96 Id. at 2636-38 (Alito, J., concurring).
9 Id. at 2624 (majority opinion).
98 Id.
99 Id. at 2625.
'oo Id. at 2624-25.
'o' Id. at 2625.
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Roberts then proceeded to analyze what he said was the precise question before
the Court: "[W]hether a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment,
restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as
promoting illegal drug use."' 2 He began his analysis of that issue by examining
prior high school speech cases, beginning with Tinker. Roberts characterized
Tinker's facts as being "quite stark, implicating concerns at the heart of the First
Amendment," and involving viewpoint political speech, which is "'at the core of
what the First Amendment is designed to protect."" 3 On the other hand, Roberts
said the asserted state interest in Tinker, avoiding the "'discomfort and unpleasant-
ness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint,"' was clearly insufficient to
justify a viewpoint restriction on core political speech.'04 Thus, although Roberts
did not characterize Tinker as involving a balancing test per se, he clearly saw the
dynamics of the Court's analysis in Tinker as essentially involving one, in which the
importance of the type of speech (very high in Tinker) was balanced against the
importance of the asserted state interest (very low).
Roberts then examined Fraser and Hazelwood. He commented that Fraser lacked
clarity in terms of the Court's mode of analysis, while Hazelwood clearly did not con-
trol the present case, since "no one would reasonably believe that Frederick's banner
bore the school's imprimatur."' 5 Nevertheless, both decisions established two basic
principles. First, both decisions clearly indicate that student speech rights are not
"'coextensive with the rights of adults,"' and that speech that was protected outside
a school might, in some cases, be unprotected inside a school."° Second, both de-
cisions show that the "substantial interference" analysis of Tinker is not the only
grounds for restricting speech. Rather, Fraser and Hazelwood both upheld restrictions
on speech even though neither involved a "substantial disruption" of the school.0 7
Roberts then switched his attention to Fourth Amendment search cases in public
schools, noting that those cases reflect the same principle found in the school speech
cases: while students do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate,
"'the school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by
public authorities are ordinarily subject.'" 0 8 More importantly, Roberts emphasized
102 Id.
103 Id. at 2626 (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003)).
Io d. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
105 See id. at 2626-27.
16 Id. at 2622 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
'07 See id. at 2626-27.
108 See id. at 2627-28 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985)). Roberts
cited and quoted from three additional cases: Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of
Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829-30 (2002) ("While schoolchildren do not
shed their constitutional rights when they enter the schoolhouse, Fourth Amendment rights ...
are different in public school than elsewhere."); Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 655-56 (1995) ("[Wlhile children assuredly do not 'shed their constitutional rights ...
at the schoolhouse gate,' the nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in school."
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that those cases also recognize the "'important-indeed, perhaps compelling'
interest" schools have in "deterring drug use by schoolchildren."'" He then went
on to discuss the seriousness of drug abuse among young people, a concern that
Congress and "[t]housands of school boards throughout the country" recognize as
of the utmost importance. "0 Roberts then concluded that drug abuse is a serious and
real problem facing schools, justifying restrictions on student speech advocating
illegal drug use, stating:
The "special characteristics of the school environment," and the
governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse ... allow
schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard
as promoting illegal drug use. Tinker warned that schools may
not prohibit student speech because of "undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance" or "a mere desire to avoid the dis-
comfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint." The danger here is far more serious and palpable.
The particular concern to prevent student drug abuse at issue here,
embodied in established school policy, extends well beyond an
abstract desire to avoid controversy."'
Thus, the Roberts majority opinion implicitly engaged in a balancing of inter-
ests, similar to how he characterized Tinker, but only the reverse. Whereas he saw
Tinker as involving a viewpoint restriction on political speech "at the core" of the
First Amendment, and the school asserting only a very weak interest (avoiding the dis-
comfort that accompanies unpopular views), the calculus was reversed in Morse. The
speech in question, advocacy of illegal drug use, was far removed from "core political
and religious speech," whereas the state's interest in combating illegal drug use was
of paramount importance. It was this balancing of interests which justified restricting
the student speech in Morse, the same balancing which Roberts viewed as requiring
that the speech be protected in Tinker.112
C. The Concurring Opinions
Justices Thomas and Alito wrote concurring opinions, with Justice Kennedy join-
ing Alito. Justice Breyer wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment and dissenting
in part, while Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Souter and
(quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506)); T.L 0., 469 U.S. at 340 ("[T]he school setting requires some
easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject.").
'09 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661).
110 Id.
... Id. at 2629 (citations omitted) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, 508, 509).
112 See id. at 2625-26.
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Ginsberg. With the exception of the Alito concurrence, these other opinions add very
little in terms of helpful analysis, at least in terms of delineating the scope of student
free speech rights. For example, Thomas, though joining the majority, argued in his
concurrence that students have no free speech rights in school, basing his position on
historical understandings of public education and on the in loco parentis principle,
in which schools stand in the role of parent." 3 Though the Thomas concurrence is
quite substantive in nature, his position is so far removed from where the rest of the
Court is at on the issue of student speech that for all practical purposes his lonely voice
is meaningless.
In contrast, Justice Breyer is the one Justice who would have decided the case
purely on the qualified immunity issue, and thus avoid the underlying First Amendment
issue altogether.114 In doing so, however, he expressed concern about both the major-
ity and dissenting opinions, the majority because it treaded into the dangerous territory
of permitting viewpoint restrictions, and the dissent because its approach would inter-
fere with school efforts to maintain discipline. 15 For Breyer, the better approach was
to avoid the issue altogether, largely because of the difficulty of finding an appropriate
First Amendment resolution to the specific facts of the case." 6
In contrast, Justice Alito's concurrence, joined by Justice Kennedy, is of some
significance, in part because it represents two critical swing Justices on the issue of
student speech. Alito, unlike Thomas, sees students retaining significant free speech
rights in high school, though necessarily modified by the special characteristics of
schools." 7 This is a position Alito expressed while sitting on the court of appeals,
where he saw Tinker as establishing a strong right to free speech for core political and
social commentary speech unless there is a specific and significant belief school oper-
ations would be disrupted."8 In the same way, his concurrence in Morse can be read
as affirming student speech rights, but Alito saw the banner displayed by Frederick
as a narrow exception, both because of the nature of the speech itself and because
of the critical school interest in combating drug abuse." 9
Alito's affirmation of student speech in Morse is seen in two ways. First, he
emphasized in several places that speech involving core political and social issues
continues to be protected under the Tinker standard, distinguishing it from the speech
in Morse that merely advocated illegal drug use. Thus, he stated at the beginning of
his concurrence that the majority opinion "provides no support for any restriction of
speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue,
including speech on issues such as 'the wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing
"3 See id. at 2629-36 (Thomas, J., concurring).
"4 See id. at 2638 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"I Id. at 2639.
116 Id. at 2639-40.
"7 See id. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring).
18 See Saxe v. State Col: Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 211 (3d Cir. 2001).
"s9 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2637-38 (Alito, J., concurring).
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marijuana for medicinal use.""'  Alito reiterated this same protective stance toward
core political and social issue speech later in the opinion, when he rejected an argu-
ment that a school could restrict any speech inconsistent with the school's educational
mission. He said that such a broad justification would permit schools to suppress
viewpoints on political and social issues, and therefore "strike[] at the very heart of
the First Amendment."' 2' Again, this communicates in no uncertain terms that he
considers viewpoint restrictions on core political and social issue speech to be highly
problematic, even in high schools.
Second, Alito strongly emphasized that the majority opinion should not be seen
as endorsing broad school authority to restrict student speech. Indeed, if anything
Alito painted a picture in which permissible restrictions on student speech are the
exceptions, not the rule, stating:
But I do not read the opinion to mean that there are necessarily
any grounds for such regulation that are not already recognized
in the holdings of this Court. In addition to Tinker, the decision
in the present case allows the restriction of speech advocating
illegal drug use; Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
260 (1986), permits the regulation of speech that is delivered in
a lewd or vulgar manner as part of a middle school program; and
Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 592 (1988),
allows a school to regulate what is in essence the school's own
speech, that is, articles that appear in a publication that is an official
school organ. I join the opinion of the court on the understanding
that the opinion does not hold that the special characteristics of the
public schools necessarily justify any other speech restrictions. 22
Alito again emphasized this same point at the end of his opinion when he stated that
upholding the restriction in Morse "stand[s] at the far reaches of what the First
Amendment permits. I join the opinion of the Court with the understanding that the
opinion does not endorse any further extension.' 23
Alito, therefore, narrowly limited Morse to the facts before the Court, making
clear that the decision should not be read as granting schools broad authority to restrict
student speech. Importantly, he seemed to suggest, as did the majority, a subtle bal-
ancing approach to resolving student speech issues, in which the importance of the
speech is weighed against the strength of the asserted government interest. The school
could restrict Frederick's banner because it did not involve core political or social issue
120 Id. at 2636 (quoting id. at 2649 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
121 Id. at 2637.
122 id.
123 Id. at 2638.
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speech, and schools have a strong interest in combating drug abuse. But he strongly
suggested that the calculus would be different if the restricted speech was more central
to First Amendment values, or if the school's interest was less substantial.
D. Stevens's Dissent
Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg. The dissent
had two primary objections to the majority opinion. First, Stevens criticized the
majority opinion for violating two cardinal principles that were the basis of Tinker:
the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination and the requirement that speech
advocating illegal conduct can be punished only if the conduct is likely to occur. 24
Stevens acknowledged that those principles might need to be modified in schools,
but nevertheless believed that Tinker largely affirmed both principles. In contrast,
Stevens said the majority opinion in Morse "trivialize[d]" those "two cardinal princi-
ples" by "invit[ing] stark viewpoint discrimination" and by allowing Frederick to be
punished for speech falling far short of what can be punished because of "its feared
consequences. ' 125 Although not completely clear, Stevens seemed to suggest that
Tinker should be interpreted as permitting viewpoint restrictions only when student
speech presents clear and present dangers to the school.
Stevens then proceeded to give a second objection to the majority, which was
really the heart of his dissent, and, as pointed out by Chief Justice Roberts, seemed
to substantially undermine his first objection. 26 Stevens assumed for the sake of
argument "that the school's concededly powerful interest in protecting its students"
would justify a restriction on speech advocating illegal drug use, and even that the
Constitution might "tolerate some targeted viewpoint discrimination in this unique
setting."127 Stevens, however, said that even if this were true, Frederick's speech fell
far short of advocating drug use or anything else, but instead was an obscure, even
nonsensical, statement. 28 Stevens argued that to justify a restriction the school would
need to "show that Frederick's supposed advocacy stands a meaningful chance of
making otherwise-abstemious students try marijuana.' ' 129 Stevens said the message
completely failed to contain the advocacy necessary to justify a restriction, but instead
was a nonsense statement. 3 °
Therefore, although Stevens began his dissent by making much about how the
majority opinion undermined Tinker, he proceeded to acknowledge that perhaps
limited viewpoint restrictions in this context might be permissible, and that his real
124 Id. at 2644-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'25 Id. at 2645-46.
126 See id. at 2629 (majority opinion).
127 Id. at 2646 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 2650.
129 Id. at 2647.
130 Id. at 2646-47.
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disagreement with the majority was over how to interpret the banner's message.13'
Chief Justice Roberts made this same point in the majority opinion, stating that
"[s]tripped of rhetorical flourishes, then, the debate between the dissent and this
opinion is less about constitutional first principles than about whether Frederick's
banner constitutes promotion of illegal drug use."'32 For this reason the dissent,
despite the "rhetorical flourishes" mentioned by Roberts, was ambiguous about how
rigid the prohibition on viewpoint restrictions should be in public schools and how
much the special characteristics of schools might permit such restrictions. 1
33
Despite this ambiguity, it is fair to say the dissenting Justices certainly saw per-
missible viewpoint restrictions on student speech as a narrow exception and not a
broad rule. The main difference between the dissenting Justices and Justices Alito
and Kennedy is over what type of speech is most protected. As noted earlier, Alito's
concurrence stressed the absence of speech about political and social issues, suggest-
ing that viewpoint restrictions on such speech could only be justified by extremely
strong school interests, such as substantial interference with the educational process.
This methodology seemed to balance the importance of the speech in question and the
strength of the school's interest. Stevens, however, did not assess the importance of
the speech, but seemed to suggest any viewpoint restriction was problematic absent
a clear threat to school operations. 34
I1. HIGH SCHOOL SPEECH RESTRICTIONS AFTER MORSE
Admittedly, Morse v. Frederick is a very narrow opinion, intentionally designed
to decide only the immediate issues before it. For that reason, any attempt to discern
broader principles and assess the decision's impact on student speech should pro-
ceed with caution. Yet, despite this limitation, Morse not only clearly affirms basic
principles from the earlier cases, but clarifies to some degree how the Tinker-Fraser-
Hazelwood cases fit together, suggesting an analytical approach distinct from that
taken by most lower courts. Moreover, the majority opinion in Morse, seen in the
light of Justice Alito' s concurrence, strongly suggests a balancing test for resolving
student speech cases, an approach already implicit in earlier decisions.
The starting point for assessing the status of high school speech restrictions after
Morse is to clearly understand what is at stake in these cases and what is not. Tinker,
Fraser, and Hazelwood-and now Morse-have all concerned the validity of content-
based restrictions on student speech. 35 Normally, of course, there is a very strong
131 Id. at 2649.
132 Id. at 2329 (majority opinion).
131 See id. at 2646-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'34 See id. at 2647-48.
'35 This is not to say that Morse and the earlier cases are irrelevant to analyzing content-
neutral speech restrictions in schools. Clearly the central premise of Morse-that free speech
analysis must be adapted to the special characteristics of schools-also applies to reviewing
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presumption against content-based restrictions on speech. 36 This is particularly true
about viewpoint restrictions, which the Court has labeled a particularly egregious form
of restriction and almost always per se invalid.'37 Yet all four student speech cases
involved content restrictions, and two of the four-Tinker and Morse-clearly in-
volved viewpoint restrictions.
The real issue in all these cases, therefore, is to what extent can schools impose
content restrictions on student speech, and in particular viewpoint restrictions. In
answering that question, Morse begins by affirming the two guiding principles first
recognized in Tinker and affirmed in Fraser and Hazelwood: that students do not
shed their First Amendment rights when entering schools, but that the scope of such
rights must be shaped by the special characteristics of schools. 138 Only Justice Thomas
seems ready to jettison student speech rights altogether, viewing schools as in an in
locus parentis relationship to students. 39 The rest of the Court affirmed that students
retain speech rights, and to some extent significant speech rights, and yet those rights
need to be limited and shaped by the function of schools.
An obvious consequence of this principle, discussed in Morse, is that speech that
might otherwise be protected under the First Amendment in other contexts might not
be protected in a school. For example, the lewd and indecent speech that the Court
in Fraser said could be restricted inside a school would have been protected in most
content-neutral restrictions. But the Supreme Court is generally more tolerant of content-
neutral restrictions on speech, usually finding them valid. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984);
Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984). This
is particularly true when restrictions occur in a nonpublic forum, which schools certainly are,
in which case content-neutral restrictions only need to be reasonable. See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680-81 (1992). Morse undoubtedly indi-
cates that in determining whether content-neutral restrictions in schools are reasonable, courts
should consider the special characteristics of schools, making a deferential standard even
more deferential.
136 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,641-43 (1994), aft'd, 520 U.S.
180 (1997); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 116 (1991); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,462 (1980); Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); ERwIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIEs § 11.2 (3d ed. 2006).
137 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(identifying viewpoint discrimination as an "egregious form of content discrimination").
As stated by Professor Rodney Smolla, "The doctrinal difference between content-based
discrimination and viewpoint-based discrimination is certainly significant. Content-based
discrimination normally triggers strict scrutiny (or some other form of heightened scrutiny),
often resulting in the law being held unconstitutional. Laws that engage in viewpoint discrim-
ination have even tougher going." RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM
OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 3:11 (1994).
'38 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2625-28.
139 See id. at 2629-36 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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other contexts, a fact acknowledged by the Court.1" Similarly, the speech restric-
tions upheld in Hazelwood and Morse would have been unconstitutional outside the
school-government cannot generally censor newspapers 4' and citizens normally
have a right to advocate illegal drug use, except under a narrow set of circumstances. 42
Even Tinker's speech-protective "substantial interference" standard anticipates some
relaxing of the normal prohibition on viewpoint discrimination.'43
None of this should be terribly surprising considering the fact that the purpose of
schools is education, not speech. Schools are not created for the purpose of facilitating
speech, nor have they been dedicated to that purpose. Unlike some types of public
property, such as parks, streets and sidewalks, which the Court has long considered as
being dedicated to speech, public schools do not have the traditional characteristics
of public forum property.'" For that reason, legitimate educational and pedagogical
concerns should be foremost in any analytical framework, and, to a certain extent,
trump free speech concerns. In this sense, schools are similar to other unique public
settings, such as military bases, courtrooms, and public employment, each of which
necessarily requires a modification of normal free speech doctrine.'45
'" In Fraser, the Court strongly suggested that the lewd speech in Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971), protected when inscribed on a jacket and worn in a public place, would
not have been protected if worn in a high school. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 682 (1986).
"' See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); JOHNE. NOWAK& RONALD
D. ROTUNDA, CONsTTruTIONAL LAW § 16.17 (7th ed. 2004).
142 Speech advocating illegal activity can normally be prohibited when it meets the strict
standard set out in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), which requires that the
speech be likely to provoke illegal conduct and that such conduct would be imminent. See
id. at 448-54.
143 The Court in Tinker emphasized in several places that the speech restriction applied to
a particular viewpoint and the Court's analytical framework must be seen in that light. More-
over, the Court's "substantial interference" standard applies to viewpoint restrictions, stating,
"Clearly, the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at least without evidence that
it is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline,
is not constitutionally permissible." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 511 (1969).
144 The Court has identified property such as streets, sidewalks and parks as property dedi-
cated in part to speech purposes and therefore some accommodation of expressive activity is
required. See, e.g., Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S.
147 (1939); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). For discussion of the
Court's public forum doctrine, see RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.47 (2d ed. 1992); Geoffrey R.
Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 SuP. CT. REv. 233.
" 4 For a discussion of First Amendment rights in special settings, see DANIEL A. FARBER,
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 193-205 (2d ed. 2003). Professor Robert Post has referred to these
unique settings and has noted that First Amendment rights are modified considerably in these
settings:
First Amendment doctrine within managerial domains differs funda-
mentally from First Amendment doctrine within public discourse. The
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If pushed far enough, however, this principle could potentially swallow up most
or all student speech rights, a concern expressed by the dissent in Morse. Yet the Court
in Morse rejected any type of broad "educational mission" argument as a basis to re-
strict speech, instead carefully grounding its holding on the threat to physical safety
posed by speech that advocates the use of illegal drugs, which was an "important-
indeed, perhaps compelling," concern in the school context.146 Justice Alito's con-
currence was even more explicit in rejecting any far-reaching "educational mission"
argument, stating that it would strike "at the very heart of the First Amendment" by
giving "public school authorities a license to suppress speech on political and social
issues based on disagreement with the viewpoint expressed." 47 Therefore, although
Morse, like earlier cases, recognized that student speech must be limited by school
characteristics, it clearly declined to grant schools a broad authority to restrict student
speech to further the amorphous concept of "educational mission," instead requiring
that speech restrictions be tied to more specific and unique school concerns.
The key question, of course, is how courts should analyze whether a particular
content-based restriction is constitutional, and it is here that Morse arguably brings
some clarification. As noted earlier, the majority of lower court decisions, in trying
to make sense of how to proceed under the Tinker-Fraser-Hazelwood trilogy, viewed
Tinker as the default position, with Fraser and Hazelwood as exceptions. 48 Thus, a
court would typically examine whether the speech in question was lewd or indecent,
in which case Fraser governed, or school-sponsored, in which case Hazelwood gov-
erned. Otherwise, Tinker's speech-protective standard applied, requiring that restric-
tions on speech be justified by showing a "substantial interference" with a school's
educational mission.149
Morse somewhat turned this approach on its head. Rather than viewing Fraser
and Hazelwood as exceptions to the default Tinker standard, the majority in Morse
viewed Fraser and Hazelwood as establishing the principle that Tinker does not
always govern. 5° From there the Court reasoned that in the same way Tinker did
state must be able to regulate speech within managerial domains so as
to achieve explicit governmental objectives. Thus the state can regulate
speech within public educational institutions so as to achieve the pur-
poses of education; it can regulate speech within the judicial system so
as to attain the ends ofjustice; it can regulate speech within the military
so as to preserve the national defense; it can regulate the speech of gov-
ernment employees so as to promote "the efficiency of the public services
[the government] performs through its employees"; and so forth.
Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALEL.J. 151, 164 (1996) (quoting Connick v. Meyers,
461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983)).
"4 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2628 (2007).
147 Id. at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring).
148 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
141 See, e.g., Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992).
150 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626-27.
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not govern the unique circumstances of Fraser and Hazelwood, so too it should not
govern the case before it. In doing so, the majority noted that whereas Tinker in-
volved a viewpoint restriction on core political speech, the speech before it in Morse
was more on the periphery of free speech values.51 The majority also noted that the
school's concern was much more real and substantial in Morse, whereas in Tinker it
was the "'mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accom-
pany an unpopular viewpoint.
' ' '9 52
From this emerges what is the essence of the Morse methodology. Rather than
seeing three separate analytical models for testing the constitutionality of content-
restrictions on student speech and attempting to fit a speech restriction into the appro-
priate model, Morse suggests a more general balancing test. Under this approach the
Court balances the nature of the speech restriction and the type of speech involved,
against the strength of the asserted school interest. As suggested by the majority
opinion, and even more explicitly by Alito's concurrence, viewpoint restrictions on
core political speech must be justified by something akin to the Tinker substantial
interference standard. Restrictions on speech less central to the First Amendment
might be justified by something less than the Tinker standard. I"3
To be sure, Morse continues to acknowledge the analytical models reflected in
Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood, but it is not hemmed in by them. Indeed, to a certain
extent the approaches developed in those cases reflect the above balancing of interests
seen in Morse. For example, "lewd and indecent" speech is not protected in schools
because of the perceived lower value of such speech on the one hand, and the very real
harm posed to school interests on the other. Similarly, the speech-protective standard
in Tinker reflects that viewpoint restrictions on core political speech can be justified
only by a very weighty government interest, such as substantially disrupting a school's
educational mission or injuring the rights of other students."4
Morse, therefore, establishes a general balancing approach to content-based
restrictions on student speech. It is important to recognize, however, that several
other analytical models exist for special circumstances that might exist in schools. For
example, even though public schools are not public forums for speech purposes, at
times schools do create limited speech forums in schools, and in such instances the
rules for a public forum apply.15  Further, the Court in Hazelwood made it clear that
a fundamental distinction exists between school-sponsored speech and school-tolerated
speech. The former is necessarily subject to the deferential "reasonably related to legit-
imate pedagogical concerns" standard.'56 Thus, the type of balancing contemplated
151 Id.
'52 Id. at 2626 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
509-10 (1969)).
13 Id. at 2638.
'5 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513-14.
s See infra Part IV.A.
156 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlineier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
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in Morse is really reserved for speech restrictions that do not involve either a school-
created speech forum nor school-sponsored speech. In such situations, Morse suggests
a more general balancing test, examining the type of speech restricted, the type of re-
striction imposed, and the importance of the schools' interest. Within this balancing
framework, however, it is clear that "lewd and indecent" speech is not protected, as
determined by Fraser, and that viewpoint restrictions on core political speech must
meet Tinker's substantial interference standard, or something of similar weight.
Before examining the impact of Morse on ordinary student speech in high schools,
the next part of this Article will briefly examine three special high school speech issues
not directly raised by Morse but which are part of a broader framework for analyzing
student speech rights. Part IV.A will discuss limited public forums in high schools
and the particular problem of student clubs. Part IV.B will examine school-sponsored
speech under Hazelwood. Although Hazelwood is obviously part of the Supreme
Court triology leading up to Morse, the Court in Hazelwood drew a clear distinction
between school-promoted speech and school-tolerated speech, with Hazelwood gov-
erning the former and now Morse the later. Finally, Part IV.C will discuss the special
problem of high school literature distribution policies that constitute prior restraints
on student speech.
IV. SPECIAL FORMS OF CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTIONS ON STUDENT SPEECH
A. Limited Public Forums and Student Clubs
As discussed above, schools are not public forums for speech purposes and
therefore do not have to meet the more speech-protective standards associated with
the Supreme Court's public forum analysis. Their primary function is education, not
speech, and therefore they need not be dedicated to speech activities. At times, how-
ever, schools might establish a limited public forum for speech within the school, and
then the rules change. The Supreme Court has stated on a number of occasions that
even though public property does not constitute a public forum, once government
opens property up for speech purposes, in other words, voluntarily creates a forum for
speech, it cannot discriminate on the basis of content.'57 Indeed, in recent years what
is now known as the limited public forum has been largely developed and refined in
the context of public schools, ranging from elementary schools to public universities.
In each case, the basic message is the same: even though a school does not need to
open its facility up for speech purposes, once it does so it cannot discriminate on the
basis of content.
Five Supreme Court decisions, all involving religious speech, have established
the current model for limited public forums in schools, which requires that access
'.. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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to such forums be content-neutral. The first case, Widmar v. Vincent, established
the basic analytical framework for the later cases, holding that a public university
could not prohibit a religious group from using campus facilities when the use of
such facilities was extended to non-religious groups. 58 The Court held that even
though the university might not be required to let student groups meet, once it did
it could not discriminate on the basis of speech content.159 The Court also rejected
the university's argument that permitting a religious group to meet would violate the
Establishment Clause. 16
The other four cases, Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v.
Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 16' Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District,162 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 163 and
Good News Club v. Milford Central School,"6 all involved this same basic fact pat-
tern. In each case, a public school opened a forum for speech, but in each instance
refused to allow a religious group to participate because of perceived Establishment
Clause problems. In Rosenberger, this involved access to university funds for student
publications, in Lamb's Chapel use of a high school facility by community groups,
and in Good News Club use of an elementary school facility by community groups.
In each case, the Court held that once a public school created a forum for speech, it
could not discriminate on the basis of content.
1 65
Of the five decisions, Mergens is the only one that directly involved student speech
in high schools, and the only one based on statutory, rather than constitutional, free
speech rights. The high school in Mergens had a policy of permitting a variety of
student groups to meet after school on a voluntary basis. Altogether, about thirty such
groups were recognized, including a chess club, a scuba diving club, a photography
club, and several service clubs.166 The respondent, Bridget Mergens, sought permission
to form a Christian club at the school for the stated purpose of reading and discussing
the Bible, having fellowship, and prayer. The school denied the request, saying that
permitting a religious group to meet would violate the Establishment Clause.'
67
The Supreme Court held that permitting other groups to meet but denying per-
mission to a religious group violated the federal Equal Access Act, passed in 1984.168
158 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981).
159 Id. at 268-69.
160 Id. at 274-75.
161 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
162 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
163 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
'64 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
'65 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 109-12; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830-32; Lamb's
Chapel, 508 U.S. at 392-94.
" Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 app.
167 Id. at 231-33.
" 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a)-(b) (2006).
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The Act in essence took the constitutional principle the Court had recognized in
Widmar for university campuses and applied it to high schools. Thus, the Equal
Access Act required that once a high school created a forum for student clubs to meet,
it could not deny access to a student group because of its content.'69 Construing the
Act in a broad fashion, as clearly intended by Congress, the Court in Mergens held
that the school's refusal to allow the religious group to meet violated the Equal Access
Act. 170 It further held that permitting a religious student club to meet on the same
terms as other student groups would not violate the Establishment Clause.'
71
Because the Court decided the case under the Equal Access Act, it did not
directly address the constitutional free speech issue. The opinion, however, had
strong constitutional undertones and almost certainly would have been decided the
same way under the First Amendment. The Equal Access Act itself was clearly
based on Widmar, applying the constitutional principles in that case to high schools.
Moreover, Rosenberger, Lamb's Chapel, and Good News Club further developed
the limited public forum concept in the school context, making it clear that once a
school creates a forum for speech, the First Amendment prohibits discriminating on
the basis of content. This was also confirmed by various Justices in Mergens itself.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, said that the
Equal Access Act simply codified what was already constitutionally required under
the First Amendment. 72 In a plurality opinion on the Establishment Clause issue,
Justice O'Connor also alluded to this point, saying "there is a crucial difference
between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause
forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free
Exercise Clauses protect.'
' 73
It seems clear, therefore, that even though high schools are not themselves forums
for speech, when they create a forum for speech within the school, administrators can-
not discriminate in terms of content. The question therefore becomes, what school
activities or structures should be considered school-created forums for speech, trigger-
ing First Amendment protection. The most obvious example of such a school-created
169 Id.
170 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 245-47.
171 The Court held 8-1 that giving religious groups equal access to school facilities did not
violate the Establishment Clause, but with no opinion commanding a majority of the Court.
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion, joined by three members of the Court, focused on an
endorsement analysis, saying that high school students are mature enough to recognize "that
a school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscrim-
inatory basis." Id. at 250 (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, con-
curred in the judgment that there was no Establishment Clause violation, but applied a coercion
test. Id. at 260-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Marshall,joined by Justice Brennan, wrote
an opinion also concurring that there was no Establishment Clause violation. Id. at 262-70
(Marshall, J., concurring).
172 Id. at 262.
"I Id. at 250 (plurality opinion).
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forum would be the scenario from Mergens, where a school permits a variety of stu-
dent groups to meet. Both the Equal Access Act and the First Amendment require that
once a school opens up such a forum for student clubs, it cannot discriminate in terms
of recognition of such clubs and the benefits granted to them.'74
Not surprisingly, the issue of recognizing or not recognizing student clubs has
generated a number of lower court decisions. Since Mergens, the basic analysis is
pretty straightforward: once schools create a limited public forum for noncurriculum-
related student clubs, they cannot discriminate based on speech content in terms of
recognition and access to school facilities. Courts have recognized, however, that both
the Equal Access Act and the Court's limited public forum analysis permit schools to
draw a distinction between curricular and noncurricular student clubs, recognizing the
former but excluding the latter. 75 But once some noncurricular clubs are permitted,
then all others must be permitted irrespective of content. This was succinctly stated
by the district court in Boyd County High School Gay Straight Alliance v. Board of
Education of Boyd County, where it said:
Once a court determines... that even one "noncurriculum-related
student group" has been permitted to meet, a limited open forum
has been created and the EAA's obligations are triggered. The
school may not deny other clubs, on the "basis of the content of
their speech, equal access to meet on school premises during non-
instructional time."
176
For this reason, lower courts will scrutinize the nature of the groups allowed to meet,
usually concluding that a school-created limited public forum has been expanded to
include noncurricular groups.
Many of these decisions since Mergens have continued to involve religious
clubs and speech, with courts typically finding efforts to exclude religious clubs or
treat them differently unconstitutional. For example, in Donovan ex. rel. Donovan
v. Punxsutawney Area School Board, the Third Circuit held that a school could not
preclude a Bible Club from meeting during a morning "activity period," a time when
other noncurricular student clubs met. 77 Similarly, in Prince v. Jacoby, the Ninth
174 20 U.S.C. § 407 l(a)-(b) (2006); see Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S.
98, 109-12 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
830-32 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
392-94 (1993); Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250 (plurality opinion); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263, 269 (1981).
"7 See Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyd County,
258 F. Supp. 2d 667, 681 (E.D. Ky. 2003); see also Mergens, 496 U.S. at 239-40.
76 258 F. Supp. 2d at 683 (quoting Mergens, 496 U.S. at 236); see also Garnett v. Renton
Sch. Dist., 772 F. Supp. 531,534 (W.D. Wash. 1991), rev 'd, 987 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 819 (1993).
7 336 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2003).
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Circuit held that a school must provide a student Bible Club the same access to
student/staff time, equipment, and school supplies as other student groups have.'
But courts have also extended the constitutional and Equal Access Act protections to
other student clubs' contents as well, most notably gay student groups.
179
Aside from student clubs, it seems unlikely that many other school activities
would constitute limited public forums, prohibiting content, or at least viewpoint dis-
crimination. Although it might be argued that at times class assignments constitute a
limited public forum, such as an assignment to write a paper on a particular topic or
give a speech in class, in the end such a position is highly problematic. One would
hope that in appropriate circumstances teachers would provide room for a variety of
perspectives on appropriate topics, but in the final analysis classroom assignments are
curricular in nature and need to be under the control of the teacher. To hold otherwise
would create a host of problems, with the most obvious one being how to distinguish
between classroom assignments that constitute limited public forums for speech and
those that do not. More fundamentally, though, such a designation would inevitably
interfere with a teacher's necessary control over curricular matters. As previously
noted, schools are created for education, not speech, and curricular concerns need
to be solidly within teachers' control to ensure that the primary educational mission
is met. For that reason classroom assignments should come under the Hazelwood
analysis, discussed in the next section.80
A more likely candidate for recognition of a limited public forum would be extra-
curricular activities, such as student assemblies or graduation ceremonies. It might
well be argued that, depending on how the activity is structured, a limited public
forum is occasionally created in such situations. On the one hand, if school officials
select a student speaker to represent the school, then the speech is clearly school spon-
sored, bearing its imprimatur, and the school can control its content. In contrast, if
speakers at graduation are selected by objective criteria, such as class rank, student
government officer, or the like, then it can be argued that a limited public forum is
created. Although the school can still control the general topics to be addressed and
require that the remarks be age-appropriate and not indecent, the school should not be
able to control the viewpoints expressed.
178 303 F.3d 1074, 1094 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 813 (2003).
171 See, e.g., Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance, 258 F. Supp. 2d 667; Colin
ex rel. Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (C.D. Cal. 2000); East High
Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ. of Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D.
Utah 1999).
"80 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,271 (1988) (stating that schools
can exercise control over activities that promote, rather than merely tolerate, student speech,
"to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers
or listeners are not exposed to material that would be inappropriate for their level of maturity,
and that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school"); see
also infra note 198 and accompanying text.
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Some limited support for such a view can be discerned from the Supreme Court's
opinion in Santa Fe Independent Community School District v. Doe ex rel. Doe.'
In that case the Court held that student-led prayer before a football game violated the
Establishment Clause, since the policy was essentially initiated by the school itself and
would have a coercive effect on those at the games. In so holding, the Court rejected
the idea that the pre-game prayer was justified under public forum analysis, noting
that the pre-game ceremony before it was quite different than the public forums in-
volving a variety of student groups that existed in cases like Mergens, Widmar, and
Rosenberger.l8 2 Those cases involved a clearly religious activity within a broader
forum of student groups, whereas in Santa Fe there was just a single speaker effec-
tively voted in by majority rule.
The Court acknowledged, however, that even a single speaker might qualify as a
limited public forum if a free range of opinion could be expressed.18 3 Thus, the Court
suggested that it is the range of opinions, rather than the number of participants, that
is critical to create a public forum in a graduation ceremony or similar non-curricular
context. Indeed, one lower court decision held to that effect, stating that where gradu-
ation speakers are selected on the basis of class rank and where the policy said student
speakers could choose "an address, poem, reading, song, musical presentation, prayer,
or any other pronouncement" a public forum had been created.' 84 In such a situation
the school can regulate the theme to be presented, and certainly prohibit lewd and
indecent material, but cannot restrict viewpoints.
This analysis suggests that in limited contexts school-sponsored activities such
as graduations and student assemblies might constitute limited public forums pro-
hibiting viewpoint restrictions on student speech. As a practical matter, however,
this will be the exception and not the rule. In most cases student speech at such activ-
ities is sufficiently under the control of the school that it should be considered school-
sponsored speech, which, like curricular speech, is governed by the standard set out
in Hazelwood.185 This does not mean that the speech is completely unprotected, but,
as the next section will discuss, courts will give substantial deference to restrictions
imposed by the school.
B. School-Sponsored Speech and Curricular Concerns
A second broad category of possible content restrictions that might occur in
school relate to school-sponsored speech, in particular involving class assignments
181 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
182 Id. at 302-04.
183 See id. at 304 ("Granting only one student access to the stage at a time does not, of
course, necessarily preclude a finding that a school has created a limited public forum.").
'84 See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998),
vacated as moot en banc, 177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999). The decision in Doe was subsequently
vacated on the grounds that the parties challenging the action lacked standing, but the reasoning
of the original opinion still makes sense.
15 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
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or school-sponsored publications. As discussed in Part I, this type of speech restric-
tion was first recognized in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, where the Court
held that a school could censor student-written articles in the school newspaper.186
In doing so, the Court drew a sharp distinction between school toleration of speech
and school promotion of speech. It said that the former concerns students' personal
expression that occurs at school, while the latter
concerns educator's authority over school-sponsored publications,
theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students,
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to
bear the imprimatur of the school. These activities may fairly
be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not
they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are
supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular
knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences.
87
The Court then held that schools could exercise editorial control over "school-
sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns. '"88
In discussing Hazelwood, both the majority opinion in Morse, as well as Justice
Alito's concurring opinion, primarily focused on the problem that school-promoted
speech might be perceived to have the school's imprimatur, which was certainly an
underlying concern in Hazelwood. Thus, Chief Justice Roberts quoted Hazelwood
as concerning "'expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public
might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school,"' and then quickly
said Hazelwood was not controlling "because no one would reasonably believe that
Frederick's banner bore the school's imprimatur.' 89 Alito even more narrowly char-
acterized Hazelwood, saying it "allows a school to regulate what is in essence the
school's own speech, that is, articles that appear in a publication that is an official
school organ."' 9
Read narrowly, both of the above statements from Morse might be understood
as limiting Hazelwood solely to situations where student speech might be "errone-
ously attributed to the school," as in the case of student publications. 9' Yet it is clear
from Hazelwood itself that school-promoted speech includes far more than sponsored
activities and publications, but also includes curricular matters. Indeed, by stating
in Hazelwood that theatrical productions and school-sponsored publications "may
186 484 U.S. 260.
187 Id. at 271.
118 Id. at 273.
189 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618,2627 (2007) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271).
190 Id. at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring).
191 Id.
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fairly be characterized as part of the curriculum,"'92 the Court seemed to assume that
curricular matters are not subject to expansive speech rights, but rather are under the
control of the school and teachers.
This point was reinforced a little later in the opinion when the Court in Hazelwood
identified three concerns that justify greater control over school-promoted speech,
saying:
Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this sec-
ond form of student expression to assure that participants learn
whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or
listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for
their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker
are not erroneously attributed to the school.'93
This makes it clear that erroneous interpretation is only one of several concerns that
animate the category of school-promoted speech, with curricular-related concerns
playing an equal if not greater role in defining the category.
Giving schools substantial control over student expression in curricular contexts
and classroom assignments makes eminent sense. Schools exist for educational, and
not speech purposes, and therefore legitimate curricular and educational concerns
should necessarily trump student speech interests. It is not surprising, therefore, that
the Court in Hazelwood stated that "[e]ducators are entitled to exercise greater con-
trol over... student expression to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the
activity is designed to teach."' 94 The ultimate test announced in Hazelwood also re-
flects deference to curricular concerns, stating that schools could exercise editorial
control over "school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are rea-
sonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."'' 95
As a practical matter, this standard appropriately gives schools substantial control
over both school-sponsored expressive activities such as newspaper and plays, but also
the content of student speech in curricular assignments. For example, schools obvi-
ously can control the subject of classroom work and assignments. If a teacher asks
students to write a paper critiquing the Lincoln presidency, a student cannot substitute
a critique of the Iraq War instead. Although refusing to allow the student to write on
the Iraq War restricts the student's speech, such a restriction is understandable and
obviously relates to legitimate pedagogical concerns. Similarly, requiring that students
do math problems in math, biology in biology, read literature in English, and write on
assigned topics in any class is clearly constitutional, even if a student strongly desires
to comment on pressing matters of political or social concern.
'92 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
193 Id.
19 Id.
Id. at 273.
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Lower courts have disagreed, however, over whether restrictions on school-
sponsored speech must be viewpoint neutral, or whether schools can also impose
viewpoint restrictions on such speech.1 96 Some courts, noting that Hazelwood itself
did not explicitly address the issue, have held that restrictions under the Hazelwood
standard must be viewpoint neutral, emphasizing the Supreme Court's general rejec-
tion of such restrictions.' 97 As recently noted by Emily Waldman, however, many of
those decisions did not involve student speech per se, but other types of speech in
school contexts, causing a confusion of issues. 9 8 The better position, therefore, and
one adopted by several federal circuits,' 99 is to permit viewpoint restrictions on school-
sponsored student speech as long as the restriction is "reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns. ' 2°° Both the tone of the opinion and the underlying concerns
informing the Hazelwood analysis support that position. In particular, the Court's
emphasis in Hazelwood that school-sponsored speech can be restricted to ensure that
students learn the appropriate lessons, are not subjected to inappropriate material, "and
that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school"
all strongly suggest that viewpoint restrictions are permitted and even anticipated.2°'
Thus, despite their general anathema under free speech jurisprudence, 2 2 view-
point restrictions on school-sponsored speech should be permitted if "reasonably
196 For recent discussions of the lower court split, see Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to
Hazelwood's Core: A New Approach to Restrictions on School-Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA.
L. REV. 63 (2008); R. George Wright, School-Sponsored Speech and the Surprising Case for
Viewpoint-Based Regulations, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 175 (2007).
... See Peck ex rel. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 631-33 (2d Cir.
2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1097 (2006); Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v. ClarkCounty
Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 829 (9th Cir. 1991); Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1319 n. 7, 1325
( lth Cir. 1989).
198 See Waldman, supra note 196. Professor Waldman's article does an excellent job ana-
lyzing the split in federal circuits, concluding that much of the problem is attributable to courts
applying Hazelwood outside the context of student speech that is school-sponsored, such as
to teacher speech or advertisers in school yearbooks. She concludes that when the focus is on
student speech that is school sponsored, then viewpoint restrictions should be permitted as
long as they are 'reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."' Id. at 112 (quoting
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271). She argues that courts use a "sliding-scale approach" to the
issue. Id. Focusing on the degree of possible perception that the speech bears the school's
imprimatur. Id.
199 See, e.g., Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-I, 298 F.3d 918, 926-28 (10th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1110 (2003); C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167, 172 (3d
Cir. 1999), affid in part, rev'dinparten banc, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533
U.S. 915 (2001).
20 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
20 Id. at 271; see also Waldman, supra note 196, at 110-23 (arguing that viewpoint re-
strictions can be imposed on school-sponsored student speech, governed by a sliding-scale
analysis); Wright, supra note 196, at 178-89 (arguing that Hazelwood anticipates viewpoint-
based restrictions on school-sponsored student speech).
202 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,829 (1995).
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related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. ' This is most easily met in a curricular
context, where teachers need to have substantial control over assignments and lesson
plans, and thus most viewpoint restrictions should be viewed as pedagogically justi-
fied. For example, to require students to write a paper or give a speech defending a
position with which they do not agree is often used to open students' minds, stretch
their thinking, and develop their analytical abilities, and as such is clearly constitu-
tional in and of itself.2°4
To recognize that schools necessarily have broad control over student speech in
curricular settings, even to the point of imposing viewpoint restrictions, is not to sug-
gest there are not limits. As noted, Hazelwood requires that school-promoted speech,
which should include curricular-related speech, must be "reasonably related to legit-
imate pedagogical concerns."2 5 This indicates that restricting viewpoints out of pure
disagreement is invalid, even if in a curricular setting. The reason for a restriction will
often be difficult to assess, of course, and deference must be given to teachers and
school officials. But mere disagreement itself should not be a valid reason to restrict
student viewpoints, even in curricular assignments or school-sponsored publications.
One particularly controversial case reflective of these issues is Settle v. Dickson
County School Board, in which a junior high school teacher refused to allow a student
to write a research paper on "The Life of Jesus Christ." 206 The teacher had assigned
the paper to the class so that they would "learn how to research a topic, synthesize the
information they gathered, and write a paper using that information. '"2° The student
originally signed up to research a paper on "Drama," and then switched her topic to
"The Life of Jesus Christ" without the teacher's permission, contrary to the assign-
ment' s instruction. The teacher rejected the new topic for a variety of reasons, includ-
ing the failure of the student to receive permission to change the topic, concerns that
203 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
204 Similarly, to require that students learn and provide certain viewpoints on an exam is
pedagogically valid, even if the students disagree with the viewpoints expressed. There is
nothing that constitutionally prohibits schools from being viewpoint based in their teaching,
whether it concerns the values behind the American flag, the meaning of a novel, the moral-
ity of America's nineteenth century policy of Manifest Destiny, or whether Marxism makes
historical sense. That schools can be viewpoint based in their teaching of such subjects also
suggests that they can test on how well students grasp those viewpoint perspectives. For
example, if a teacher has taught a novel from one perspective, the teacher can have an exam
question or paper assignment tailored to that perspective, even if students disagree and think
the idea is nonsense or worse. Although forcing students to conform to that viewpoint to get
a passing grade arguably restricts student speech, there would be a legitimate pedagogical basis
to support such a restriction on speech.
205 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
206 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 989 (1995). For commentary on Settle,
see Phillip Michael McKenney, Note, "Learning is More Vital in the Classroom than Free
Speech": Settle v. Dickson County School Board, 29 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1761 (1996).
101 Settle, 53 F.3d at 153.
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the topic was not appropriate for the student because the student already knew about
Christ and could produce an outline without doing significant research, and all the
sources for the life of Jesus derive from just one source, the Bible. However, the
teacher also stressed in several different ways that religion was not an appropriate
topic for public schools. The student was eventually given a zero for the assignment
when she refused to change topics, and she sued, arguing that her free speech rights
had been violated.2 °8
The Sixth Circuit held for the school, finding that the teacher and school had not
violated the student's free speech rights. In doing so, the court emphasized a teacher's
right to have complete control over curricular matters, stating:
Where learning is the focus, as in the classroom, student speech
may be even more circumscribed than in the school newspaper or
other open forum. So long as the teacher limits speech or grades
speech in the classroom in the name of learning and not as a
pretext for punishing the student for her race, gender, economic
class, religion or political persuasion, the federal courts should
not interfere. 0 9
The court acknowledged that several of the teacher's reasons for rejecting the student's
desired topic were erroneous, such as believing religious topics were forbidden in
public schools and that there was only one source for a paper on Jesus Christ, but the
court nevertheless believed the teacher had legitimate pedagogical reasons to refuse
the student's request.210 More fundamentally, though, the court believed that effective
education requires that teachers have complete control of their classrooms, stating,
"Teachers therefore must be given broad discretion to give grades and conduct class
discussion based on the content of speech. Learning is more vital in the classroom
than free speech. ' 1l
20' Id. at 153-55.
209 Id. at 155.
210 Id. at 156.
211 Id. A concurring judge in Settle agreed with the majority's opinion that the facts of the
case presented no viable First Amendment claim by the student. The concurrence was not con-
vinced that all of the teacher's reasons for rejecting the topic were valid, but largely attributed
that to an error in judgment, stating:
Implicit in the majority's opinion is the view that classroom teachers can
make mistakes of judgment in determining how to teach, and these mis-
takes, so long as they are not based on impermissible criteria, do not give
rise to claims of constitutional deprivations. I wholly agree. And on the
facts of this case, that is all that needs to be said.
Id. at 157.
The concurrence emphasized, however, that the teacher was in error in saying that religion
was an inappropriate topic for a paper. More importantly, the concurrence drew a distinction
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This position seems largely correct, if perhaps slightly overstated. Teachers need
to be given control of curricular assignments and, as recognized by the court, even the
freedom to make mistakes in judgment. Anything less than that would substantially
interfere with a school's primary educational mission. For that reason schools and
teachers need substantial leeway in guiding the content of assignments and curricular
work, including even the content of students' own work. Hostility toward particular
ideas and viewpoints is not a valid ground for restricting speech, and, if proven, would
constitute a violation of a student's free speech rights in school-sponsored and even
curricular settings. But that is difficult to establish.2"2 Absent that, student free
speech rights should rarely be implicated in the context of curricular work or school-
sponsored activities such as newspapers and plays.
Finally, difficult issues will occasionally arise as to whether student speech is
school-sponsored. As noted, any speech occurring in a curricular setting as part of an
assignment clearly is, but speech occurring in extracurricular activities is sometimes
less clear. As a general matter, however, courts have viewed most extracurricular
activities as school-sponsored, especially if there is a likelihood they will be seen as
bearing a school's imprimatur. For example, in Fleming v. Jefferson County School
District R-1, the Tenth Circuit held that a school project allowing students to create
four inch by four inch tiles that would be displayed throughout the building to com-
memorate the shooting at Columbine High School constituted school-sponsored
speech, allowing the school to control the content of the tiles.21 3 A student who
wanted to create a religious depiction but was prohibited argued that the school had
in effect created a limited public forum. The court disagreed, however, saying that the
mural was school-sponsored and thus subject to school control. As such, prohibiting
a religious depiction was justified because of the likelihood that observers would see
the mural as bearing the school's imprimatur.2 4 Courts have reached similar results
with regard to graduation exercises and school assemblies, 2 5 and at the elementary
level with students displaying posters in hallways.2 6
between research papers and opinion papers, saying that "[hiad the assignment been to write
a paper of opinion, and had [the teacher] rejected the paper on the ground of its religious con-
tent alone, Brittney's freedom of speech truly would have been violated." Id. at 159.
212 Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,382-85 (1968) (rejecting the argument that
federal legislation had been passed with the purpose of violating free speech rights).
213 298 F.3d 918, 929-31 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1110 (2003).
214 Id.
215 See Brody ex rel. Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1992) (graduation
exercises), affid in part, rev'd in part en banc, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533
U.S. 915 (2001); Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989) (school assemblies and stu-
dent elections), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1021 (1990).
216 See Peck ex rel. Peck v. Balwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 547 U.S. 1097 (2006); C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Olivia, 195 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 1999), affid
in part, rev'd in part en banc, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 915 (2001).
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C. Distribution Policies and Prior Restraints
A third and particularly problematic type of content-based restriction on student
speech concerns requirements that literature and printed material first be reviewed and
approved by school officials before students can distribute them at school. School
officials certainly have a strong interest in controlling how, when, and where students
distribute literature in the schools. Passing out brochures, flyers, and handbills can
result in litter, cause congestion in hallways, and interfere with the orderly functioning
of the school.
For this reason content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions on when and
where literature is distributed are clearly valid. Even in a public forum courts are
deferential to reasonable restrictions, 217 and this should certainly be true in the more
unique setting of schools, which are dedicated to education and not speech. School
hallways are not public sidewalks, and regulating the distribution of literature to avoid
congestion and litter is clearly within a school's power if done without reference to
content.218 Indeed, even a content-neutral total ban on distribution of non-school mate-
rial might be justified if a school can establish that the ban represented a reasonable
regulation in terms of the needs and operation of the school.
Distribution policies become more problematic, however, when schools require
that the school first review and approve the content of literature prior to distribution.
For example, a school might review materials to make sure they are not obscene, lewd,
indecent, offensive or insulting to other students, inappropriate for the age of the
audience, or likely to cause a material disruption in the school.2 19 Although there are
understandable reasons for such a policy, such a review process constitutes a prior
restraint on speech which strikes at the very heart of the First Amendment.220 Permit
217 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Clark v. Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
218 The Supreme Court had held that distributing literature and handbills are a unique
medium of communication and cannot be banned from streets and sidewalks. Schneider v.
New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162-63 (1939).
219 See, e.g., Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding as overly broad a
distribution policy that prohibits materials that include advertisements for cigarettes, alcohol,
and drugs, and expression that is "inappropriate to the maturity level of the students or [is]
obscene, libelous, or invade[s] the privacy of others"); Bystrom ex rel. Bystrom v. Fridley High
Sch. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 14, 822 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1987) (upholding a distribution policy that
prohibits libelous, indecent, vulgar materials, and materials that present a clear and present
likelihood of material disruption of school activities).
220 The Supreme Court has long viewed prior restraints on speech as a particularly serious
threat to the First Amendment. See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,559 (1976)
("Prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringe-
ment on First Amendment rights."). See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 136, § 11.2.3.2
(discussing the negative aspects of prior restraints). Lower courts have frequently recognized
that school policies that require review and approval before materials can be distributed
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and licensing schemes to engage in speech, which in essence are what a review and
approval process is, are a particularly troublesome form of censorship, because permits
can so easily be granted or denied based on whether the reviewing official approves
or disapproves of the message, rather than on more legitimate non-speech concerns
that might exist.
22
'
For that reason the Supreme Court in other contexts has approved licensing
schemes for speech activities only when safeguards are in place to ensure that permits
are not granted or denied based on content.222 This usually requires that permit deci-
sions turn on non-speech concerns, and that appropriate standards exist to guide the
reviewer and limit discretion. Schemes which lack standards, or fail to have standards
that effectively limit discretion, are often struck down as invalid, since they leave too
much room for the process to operate in a content-discriminatory manner.223
Yet school literature distribution policies that require review and approval are not
just susceptible to possible content discrimination, they are designed for that very pur-
pose. As noted above, review and approval policies typically serve the purpose of
ensuring that inappropriate literature and messages are not distributed to students.
In almost any other setting such content-based licensing schemes would be anathema
to the First Amendment and held unconstitutional. Partly for that reason some lower
courts have taken a particularly harsh view of such policies, holding or suggesting that
any prior restraint that turns on content is invalid. For example, in Burch v. Barker
the Ninth Circuit struck down a school policy of requiring submission and approval
of any materials before distribution. 224 Although the court acknowledged that review
and approval is permissible for school-sponsored speech, such as newspapers, it said
such a prior restraint is unconstitutional for other types of student speech.225 Other
courts have suggested that pre-approval policies are permitted only in one narrow
situation, when they are carefully designed to meet the Tinker standard of a substantial
disruption of the school.226
constitute prior restraints on speech. See, e.g., Burch, 861 F.2d at 1154-55; Quarterman ex
rel. Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54,57-58 (4th Cir. 1971); Riseman v. Sch. Comm. of City
of Quincy, 439 F.2d 148, 149-50 (1st Cir. 1971); Westfield High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City
of Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d 98, 124 (D. Mass. 2003).
221 See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988); Kunz v.
New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
222 See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 323-25 (2002); Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U.S. 569 574-76 (1941).
223 See, e.g., Lakewood, 486 U.S. 750; Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
224 861 F.2d 1149, 1151 (9th Cir. 1988).
225 Id. at 1158-59.
226 See Nitzberg ex rel. Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975); Baughman ex rel.
Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973); Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462
F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972); Fujishima v. Bd. of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972); Eisner v.
Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971); Hernandez v. Hanson, 430 F. Supp. 1154
(D. Neb. 1977). But see Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1980) (suggesting that
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However, despite the normally strong presumption against any content-based prior
restraint, both Morse and the earlier Supreme Court student speech decisions suggest
a greater capacity to use prior restraints in public schools than in other settings. As
frequently noted, a central premise of the Court's school speech cases is that even
though students retain speech rights in school, the extent of such rights is shaped and
limited by the special characteristics of schools, and that schools can regulate speech
in ways that might be impermissible elsewhere.227 This is clearly seen with regard
to viewpoint restrictions, which are nearly per se invalid in most contexts, but are
permitted to a certain extent in schools. For similar reasons, content-based prior re-
straints, though almost always invalid elsewhere, should be permitted in narrowly
drawn contexts in schools.22
A policy that students, prior to distributing literature at school, first submit it for
review and approval should be constitutional if it meets two requirements: first, any
content review must be limited to speech that can be prohibited in schools, and second,
the policy must have sufficiently clear standards to guide the review. The first re-
quirement, that content reviews be limited to speech that can be prohibited, would be
largely determined by the Morse balancing test. Although some lower courts have
limited content reviews to speech that would meet the Tinker substantial interference
standard,229 Morse makes clear that the limits of what speech schools can restrict are
not limited to Tinker.230 Instead, Morse suggests that the types of speech that can be
prohibited, and thus be subject to content reviews under a distribution policy, turns
on both how central or peripheral the speech in question is to First Amendment values,
and the importance of the state's interest in prohibiting the speech.
Obvious examples of contents that can be the basis of review and disapproval
policies are those the Court has already recognized as being subject to restriction in
school: obscene, lewd and indecent speech in Fraser and speech advocating illegal
drug use in Morse. In fact, lower courts have upheld review policies designed to pro-
hibit such speech.2 31 Similarly, speech that presents a "clear and present danger" of
a substantial disruption of school activity, as set out in Tinker, should also be a valid
basis for content review. Lower courts have also recognized this, though they have
Tinker's substantial disruption standard is one possible reason to justify prior restraint on
distribution, but not necessarily the sole justification).
227 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
228 For an early article taking the opposite position, see Note, Prior Restraints in Public
High Schools, 82 YALE L.J. 1325 (1973) (arguing that prior restraints on distribution of printed
material in high schools are unconstitutional).
229 See, e.g., Shanley, 462 F.2d at 977; Riseman v. Sch. Comm. of Quincy, 439 F.2d 148
(lst Cir. 1971).
230 See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
231 See Bystrom ex rel. Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 14,822 F.2d 747,
751 (8th Cir. 1987) (allowing review for, inter alia, indecent and vulgar speech); Williams,
622 F.2d 1200.
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required that policies contain clear standards to guide school officials in determining
what speech would meet the "substantial disruption" threshold.232
The above categories do not exhaust speech that may be restricted under Morse,
but are indicative of the types of contents that might be the basis of review. One other
category that deserves mentioning is speech that might cause harm to other students
in a significant manner, either libelous or scandalous in nature, or that constitutes a
form of hate speech to a particular group. Although Tinker focused mostly on speech
disruptive to a school, it also stated that valid viewpoint restrictions can be placed
on speech that "collid[es] with the rights of others" or invades the rights of other stu-
dents.233 This certainly requires something more than speech that offends others or
causes controversy, but at some point speech is potentially so injurious to other students
that it can be prohibited in schools, even if the same speech is protected elsewhere.234
Along those lines, lower courts have approved guidelines that prohibit libelous mate-
rial.235 Beyond that, schools arguably should be able to review for material that con-
tains hate speech and other messages that are likely to cause significant psychological
harm to other students, a topic that will be explored more in Part V.
On the other hand, prior restraints for purposes of prohibiting certain types of
speech would clearly be unconstitutional. For example, in Rivera v. East Otero
School District R-1, the court struck down a pre-distribution review policy that pro-
hibited "material that proselytizes a particular religious or political belief. ' 236 Such
speech, of course, is at the heart of the First Amendment, and any school policy that
permits distribution of literature but prohibits religious and political views is clearly
unconstitutional. 237 Similarly, concerns that materials might be offensive or cause
discomfort are not a valid basis to forbid distribution of literature.
238
The second requirement for a valid review and approval process, in addition to
being limited to speech content that would not be protected under Morse, is that the
policies provide sufficiently clear standards to guide school officials in granting or
denying approval. The purpose of requiring clear standards is to ensure that approval
and denial decisions are made according to constitutionally permissible grounds, and
232 See Shanley, 462 F.2d at 977; Riseman, 439 F.2d at 149-50.
233 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
234 See Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1176 (9th Cir.
2006) (holding that a t-shirt with words attacking homosexuality can be prohibited under Tinker
because it invades the rights of other students), vacated as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
235 See Bystrom, 822 F.2d at 759.
236 721 F. Supp. 1189, 1193-95 (D. Colo. 1989).
237 Although a school might try to justify a ban on religious materials because of Establish-
ment Clause concerns, such a view is clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court has consistently
held that treating religious speech in public schools the same as other student speech, no
better and no worse, avoids any Establishment Clause problems. See, e.g., Good News Club
v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Westside Rd. of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226 (1990).
238 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
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not based on the personal preferences of the reviewing authority. The Supreme
Court has frequently stated that to be constitutional, licensing schemes must have
clear standards. 239 Lower courts have similarly required such standards for review
and approval policies in public schools, frequently striking down policies containing
overly broad and vague language. For example, in Baughman ex rel. Baughman v.
Freienmuth, the Fourth Circuit held that a review policy that permitted schools to
prohibit distribution of "obscene" and "libelous" materials was unnecessarily vague
as a basis to impose a prior restraint on speech, even though the same standard might
have been valid to impose sanctions after distribution.'l Similarly, in Quarterman
ex rel. Quarterman v. Byrd, the court struck down a review and approval process that
failed to provide any criteria to guide school officials in deciding to grant or deny
permission to distribute literature.24
Courts have also struck down policies which merely recited the "substantial
interference" language from Tinker, finding it did not provide sufficient guidance
to school authorities because of its generalized nature. For example, in Nitzberg ex
rel. Nitzberg v. Parks, the Fourth Circuit held a policy unconstitutional that said a
school could prohibit distribution only if the principal could "forecast substantial
,,242disruption of or material interference with school activities. Although the policy
was clearly based on language from Tinker, the court said it failed to give guidance
as to what amounted to a "substantial disruption of or material interference with"
school activity, and failed to provide criteria by which to predict such a disruption.243
The Ninth Circuit in Burch v. Barker also stuck down a review policy which in-
cluded, among other things, provision for prohibiting distribution of materials when
evidence indicated "that significant or substantial disruption of the normal operation
of the school" would result.244
Other courts, however, have been more tolerant of review policies, especially
when efforts are made to provide some guidance in applying standards. A leading
case in this regard is Bystrom ex rel. Bystrom v. Fridley High School, where the Eighth
Circuit examined a pre-distribution review and approval policy that provided six pos-
sible grounds to prohibit distribution, finding five of the six guidelines valid. 245 The
court noted that most of the guidelines addressed legitimate concerns for schools, but
also that the review policy elaborated on the terms used and provided guidance in how
they should be applied. For example, Guideline A, which prohibited distribution of
material "obscene to minors," specifically incorporated the Supreme Court standards
239 See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988); Saia v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
240 478 F.2d 1345, 1350-51 (4th Cir. 1973).
241 453 F.2d 54, 59 (4th Cir. 1971).
242 525 F.2d 378, 381 (4th Cir. 1975).
243 Id. at 383.
244 861 F.2d 1149, 1156 (9th Cir. 1988).
245 822 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1987).
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in defining that term.246 Similarly, Guideline B, which prohibited "libelous" materials,
incorporated the New York Times v. Sullivan standard for "libelous," ensuring ade-
quate protection for speech interests. 7 Two of the guidelines, Guideline C, which
prohibited materials that are "pervasively indecent or vulgar," and Guideline D, which
prohibited material that "advertises any product or service not permitted to minors by
law," were deemed sufficiently clear on their face, the court noting that the prohibition
of "vulgar and indecent" material was governed by the Supreme Court's decision in
Fraser, and that the prohibition on advertising illegal goods and services was suffi-
ciently clear on its own terms.248
Importantly, the court also upheld Guideline G, which prohibited distribution of
literature that "presents a clear and present likelihood that.., it will cause a material
and substantial disruption of the proper and orderly operation and discipline of the
school or school activities."24 ' This guideline also provided criteria to make this deter-
mination, stating, "[I]n order for expression to be considered disruptive, there must
exist specific facts upon which the likelihood of disruption can be forecasted includ-
ing past experience in the school, current events influencing student activities and be-
havior, and instances of actual or threatened disruption relating to the written material
in question."25 The court found that this guideline, together with the criteria to be
applied, was sufficient to guide school officials.251
The approach taken in Bystrom is a reasonable one and arguably justified by the
Supreme Court's student speech jurisprudence. Notwithstanding the presumption
against prior restraints in most circumstances, the Court has been clear that student
free speech rights must be adjusted to the special characteristics of schools. 52 In the
same way that viewpoint restrictions, almost always invalid in other contexts, might
be permitted in some instances in school, prior restraints might also be permitted, even
those triggered by particular contents. The educational mission of schools, the lessons
of civility and respect, and the protection of other students all suggest that school
officials have some limited authority to prohibit inappropriate speech before it occurs.
Indeed, even those courts invalidating review and approval policies because of overly
broad and vague standards usually acknowledged that prior restraints in schools are
not per se invalid.253 To be constitutional, however, such review and approval policies
can only target speech that would be unprotected in schools, and second, they must
246 Id. at 751-52.
247 Id. at 752 (referring to N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
248 Id. at 752-53.
249 Id. at 754.
250 Id.
251 id.
252 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988).
253 See Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 1988) (acknowledging that most
courts that invalidated review and approval policies "refrained from holding that any policy
of prior review was per se a violation of the first amendment").
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provide specifically clear criteria to limit the discretion of school officials in granting
or denying students the right to distribute materials.
V. CONTENT RESTRICTIONS ON ORDINARY STUDENT SPEECH: T-SHIRTS,
BUTTONS, AND FLAGS
The previous section examined three special categories of restrictions on student
speech-limited public forums, school-sponsored speech, and prior restraints-that
raise special concerns and trigger special analysis. The majority of student speech
issues, however, concern private student speech that is neither school-sponsored nor
occurs in a limited public forum. As noted by the Court in Hazelwood, this is stu-
dent speech that happens to occur on school property, and goes to the heart of what
it means for students to have meaningful speech rights.2 4
This type of speech that happens to occur on school property can take any number
of forms. Most of the cases that have emerged in this area, however, have involved
visual forms of expression. Tinker and Morse themselves involved visual messages,
the black armband in Tinker, understood as protesting the Vietnam War, and the banner
in Morse advocating illegal drug use. Lower court decisions have similarly involved
visual forms of expression, most commonly messages on t-shirts, but also wearing
buttons and putting up banners.5 The common theme in all these cases, though, is
that schools disapprove of the message conveyed and prohibit the student from dis-
playing it, even though the message would be protected in other contexts.
As discussed earlier, most lower courts have approached these types of restrictions
by assuming that Tinker is the general rule that governs, with Fraser and Hazelwood
being narrow exceptions.256 Under this approach, if the speech is either lewd/indecent
or school-sponsored, it can be restricted, but otherwise any restrictions must meet the
substantial interference standard of Tinker. As a result, most viewpoint restrictions
on student speech that happen to occur on school property have been struck down
unless they are considered indecent. 257 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit in Morse applied this
very approach, reasoning that the speech was protected because it involved a view-
point restriction and was neither indecent nor lewd, and was not school-sponsored. 258
The court, therefore, applied the Tinker substantial interference standard, which could
not be met.259
254 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
255 For a recent discussion of student speech in high school, including restrictions on t-shirt
expression, see Ralph D. Mawdsley, Sailing the Uncharted Waters of Free Speech Rights in
Public Schools: The Rocky Shoals and Uncertain Currents of Student T-shirt Expression, 219
WEST EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2007).
256 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 127 S. Ct.
2618 (2007).
258 id.
259 Id. at 1124.
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As discussed in Part I, Morse changed that focus and analysis to a certain extent.
Rather than making Tinker the default position for any restrictions that do not fall
under Fraser and Hazelwood, the Morse majority saw Fraser and Hazelwood as estab-
lishing the principle that Tinker does not always govern. 26° The majority opinion and
Justice Alito's concurrence then engaged in what was essentially a balancing test,
noting the peripheral nature of the restricted speech on the one hand, and schools'
compelling interest in addressing drug abuse on the other.26' More generally, the
majority and Alito opinions can be read to suggest a balancing test that considers the
nature of the restriction imposed, the value of the speech restricted and the importance
of the asserted school interest.
It should be emphasized, however, that even though Morse suggests a shift in
how the Court approaches restrictions on student speech, the opinion itself does not
suggest that this balancing should necessarily be skewed toward a school's interest
in regulation. In holding that the speech in Morse could be restricted, the majority
opinion emphasized that, unlike Tinker, which involved political speech at the core
of the First Amendment, Frederick's banner did not "convey[ ] any sort of political
or religious" speech.262 It also stressed the extremely important function of schools
in combating drug abuse.263 Thus, rather than giving schools broad authority to re-
strict speech, the balancing implicit in the majority suggests a very speech-protective
approach if the speech in question is political or religious, or if the school's interest
is less compelling.
Justice Alito's concurrence was even more emphatic in limiting Morse, stating
in the first sentence that the majority opinion "provides no support for any restriction
of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social
issue. 264 Indeed, Alito goes so far as to suggest there are no grounds for restricting
student speech other than those currently recognized, essentially a form of the Tinker
default rule adopted by lower courts, but with speech advocating illegal drug use
added as a third exception.265 Such a position seems an unnecessarily narrow reading
of Morse, and inconsistent with the balancing that is really going on by the majority
and by Alito himself. Yet it reflects what is a truly speech-protective stance, especially
for speech "commenting on any political or social issue," a position Alito had clearly
articulated while on the Third Circuit.266
Thus, the implicit balancing that is going on in both the majority and Alito's
concurring opinion is not one that takes student speech rights lightly; indeed, when
260 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626-27.
261 Id. at 2625; id. at 2637-38 (Alito, J., concurring).
262 Id. at 2625 (majority opinion).
263 Id. at 2628-29.
264 Id. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring).
265 Id. at 2637 ("But I do not read the [majority] opinion to mean that there are necessarily
any grounds for such regulation that are not already recognized in the holdings of this Court.").
266 See Saxe v. State Coil. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001).
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it comes to political and religious speech, and commentary on social issues, it is a
balancing that seems to weigh rather heavily in favor of student rights. That is not
to suggest that such speech is always protected; it clearly is not.267 But the opinions
in Morse still reflect a resolve to provide significant protection to speech that the
Justices view as lying at the heart of the First Amendment.
A starting point for analysis in determining what schools can and cannot do is to
recognize the distinction emphasized in Morse between speech at the core of the First
Amendment, deserving of significant protection, and speech that is less central to the
First Amendment. The Court itself has already identified two categories of speech
deserving less protection, lewd and indecent speech in Fraser26 and speech advocat-
ing illegal drug use in Morse.269 Although both decisions in part turned on the sub-
stantial school interests in restricting the speech, both decisions were also based on the
perceived lesser value of the speech itself.270 For that reason, student speech, includ-
ing profanity, sexual references, and the like, can be restricted in schools. Although
there will at times be difficult questions of what might qualify as lewd and indecent,
in most instances it is pretty clear. Moreover, this includes not only expressions that
are solely lewd and indecent, but also lewd and indecent ways of communicating more
core political and social ideas.
Similarly, student speech advocating illegal drug use can also be prohibited, as
established by Morse.27' This speech, though protected under the First Amendment
generally, is hardly central to its purposes, and at the same time poses a substantial and
real concern to schools.272 Indeed, it seems clear that schools can also prohibit speech
advocating or glorifying drinking. For example, in Gano ex rel. Gano v. School
District No. 411 of Twin Falls, the court held that a school could prohibit a student
wearing a t-shirt depicting three school administrators acting drunk with words that
read "It doesn't get any better than this. 273 The court noted that the shirt was not only
potentially libelous, but also stressed the strong school interest in addressing alcohol
abuse among students.274
267 Tinker itself indicates that even viewpoint restrictions on core political speech might
be justified in narrow circumstances, such as when the speech substantially interferes with
school activities. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
268 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
269 Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618.
270 See id. at 2625 ("[Nlot even Frederick argues that the banner conveys any sort of political
or religious message."); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680 ("The marked distinction between the political
'message' of the armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of respondent's speech in this
case seems to have been given little weight by the Court of Appeals.").
271 Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618.
272 Id. at 2628-29.
273 674 F. Supp. 796, 797 (D. Idaho 1987).
274 Id. at 798-99; cf. Mclntire v. Bethel Sch. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 3, 804 F. Supp. 1415
(W.D. Okla. 1992) (holding that the school failed to establish that a t-shirt that said "the best
of the night's adventures are reserved for people with nothing planned" promoted drinking,
and thus the speech was protected under Tinker).
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For similar reasons it seems clear that schools should be able to restrict messages
reasonably understood to promote violence. As is true with speech advocating illegal
drugs and drinking, speech advocating violence hardly rises to the level of core polit-
ical speech. Even more importantly, speech advocating violence poses a significant
threat to schools, unfortunately a very real threat in today's society. For that reason,
schools should be able to prohibit visual images depicting violence or words pro-
moting violence. Schools should also be able to prohibit displays of guns on shirts,
though one lower court held a picture of a rifle was protected when it was part of a
Marine Corps creed about rifles.275
There will be instances, of course, where it is more difficult to assess the nature
of the speech in question and the threat it poses to school interests. For example, in
Boroff v. Van Wert City Board of Education, the Sixth Circuit held that a school ban
on Marilyn Manson t-shirts was constitutional.276 In that case, a student wore a Marilyn
Manson t-shirt that depicted a three-faced Jesus that had the words "See No Truth.
Hear No Truth. Speak No Truth." on the front, while the back said "BELIEVE" with
the letters "LIE" highlighted, even though school policy specifically prohibited Marilyn
Manson t-shirts.277 The Sixth Circuit upheld the school ban, finding that the speech
in question fell under the Fraser standard because it was vulgar and offensive speech.
In particular, the court said the band promoted destructive conduct and demoralizing
values that were contrary to the school's educational mission, and therefore the school
was justified in prohibiting the t-shirts.278
The court's analysis in Boroffis questionable, especially to the extent that it sug-
gests a school district can ban a t-shirt just because it promotes values contrary to the
educational mission of a school, an argument implicitly rejected by the majority and
specifically rejected by the Alito concurrence in Morse.279 This is true even if the shirt
in some general way represents "destructive conduct and demoralizing values. 280 Yet
at the same time the speech in Boroff did not lie at the core of the First Amendment,
at least as understood by the Justices in Morse. Furthermore, many of the lyrics from
Marilyn Manson songs probably could be prohibited from t-shirts at school, at least
to the extent that they promote violence, involve racial epitaphs, and even encour-
age suicide.2 ' Thus, the case arguably turns on whether Marilyn Manson t-shirts
275 See Griggs ex rel. Griggs v. Fort Wayne Sch. Bd., 359 F. Supp. 2d 731 (N.D. Ind. 2005).
276 220 F.3d 465, 466 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 920 (2001).
277 Id. at 467.
278 Id. at 470-71.
279 Although the school district in Morse argued it could restrict speech contrary to its edu-
cational mission, the majority opinion grounded its analysis in the very real threat and
problem that illegal drug use poses to schools. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618,
2628-29 (2007). Justice Alito specifically and very strongly rejected any "educational
mission" arguments, saying it would effectively eliminate all student speech rights. See id.
at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring).
280 Boroff, 220 F.3d at 469.
281 See id. at 470 (citing lyrics that include "you can kill yourself now because you're dead
in my mind," "let's jump upon the sharp swords / and cut away our smiles / without the threat
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communicate and are commonly understood to represent many of the lyrics in the
group's songs. If the shirts are reasonably understood to represent the lyrics, then they
can arguably be banned, not because the messages are contrary to a school's educa-
tional mission of promoting human dignity and respect for others, but because the
message reflected in many of the group's lyrics poses a very real threat to schools.
What all these forms of speech have in common is that they involve speech less
central to the First Amendment on the one hand, and also speech that implicates very
real concerns to schools on the other. A much more difficult question is the extent to
which schools can impose content, and in particular, viewpoint restrictions on polit-
ical, religious, and social commentary speech in schools. It is here that both the Morse
majority, and even more so Justice Alito's concurrence, shift the scales heavily on
the side of student speech rights.282 Whereas lewd or indecent speech and speech ad-
vocating drugs, alcohol, and violence are less central to the First Amendment, political
and similar speech go to the heart of the First Amendment, and the Justices in Morse
made it clear such speech will be given significant protection.2 3
In evaluating restrictions on core political and religious speech in schools, an
initial distinction should be made between subject matter and viewpoint restrictions
affecting such speech. Although subject matter restrictions are subject to rigorous
scrutiny, they are not as problematic as viewpoint restrictions, and might be acceptable
in limited circumstances. 284 This would certainly be true where they were used to allo-
cate limited resources and space used for communication. For example, a require-
ment that bulletin boards or banners in school hallways be limited to school-related
activities, or even to community activities, is reasonable considering the limited space
available. Similarly, allowing students to put banners or flyers in hallways to adver-
tise school or extracurricular activities, but prohibit their use for political or religious
messages, should be valid in light of the dedicated purposes of schools.
However, it would almost certainly be unconstitutional to ban wearing t-shirts
or buttons with political, religious, or social commentary messages in school. Even
though this would be a subject-matter, rather than viewpoint restriction, it would still
constitute a significant impact on core First Amendment speech and require a sig-
nificant school interest. Unlike restricting access to bulletin boards or hallways for
speech, both of which are limited resources in which the school has an important
interest in determining how they are allocated, buttons and t-shirts are personal in
of death / there's no reason to live at all," and "[1]et's just kill everyone and let your god sort
them out / [fluck it").
282 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638.
283 Id. at 2626.
284 See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,95 (1972) ("[Glovernment has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.").
See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 136 (discussing the importance of distinguishing
content-based and content-neutral laws); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the
First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 615 (1991).
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nature and, therefore, closely and uniquely express the beliefs and values of the indi-
vidual student.285 There is no general school interest that would justify prohibiting
the personal wearing of messages, and thus a subject matter ban on the messages that
might be worn would need to meet a standard comparable to that set out in Tinker.
The most critical issues, however, and what takes us to the heart of restrictions
on student speech, are viewpoint restrictions on core political and religious speech.
Such restrictions are almost inevitably unconstitutional in other contexts. 6 Free
speech rights are to an extent adjusted by the special characteristics of schools, how-
ever, and Tinker itself established that even the strong presumption against view-
point restrictions will be modified to some extent in public school.287 Nevertheless,
Tinker indicates that only a very strong school interest will justify viewpoint restrictions
on political speech, even when occurring in school. 8 The Morse opinions clearly
affirmed this position, emphasizing the significant protection afforded political,
religious, and social commentary speech in public schools.289
It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that when viewpoint restrictions are placed
on core political, religious, and social commentary speech in schools, the Morse balanc-
ing approach requires an extremely strong school interest to justify such a restriction.
As a practical matter, the most obvious justifications, and perhaps the only real ones,
would be those originally recognized in Tinker. There the Court laid out the basic stan-
dard for when viewpoint restrictions might be placed on core political speech, stating:
A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom
hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on
the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opin-
ions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam,
if he does so without "materially and substantially interfer[ing]
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the school"
and without colliding with the rights of others. But conduct by
the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason-whether it
stems from time, place, or type of behavior-materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights
of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guar-
antee of freedom of speech.29
285 Compare, for example, City ofLaDue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994), in which the Court
held unconstitutional a ban on political yard signs, emphasizing the unique role such signs
play in identifying the beliefs and views of homeowners.
286 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(stating that viewpoint restrictions are an "egregious form of content discrimination"); FARBER,
supra note 145, at 29-30.
287 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
2n Id. at 512-13.
"' Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2625 (2007); id. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring).
290 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512-13 (citations omitted).
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This quote from Tinker suggests two possible justifications to restrict student
speech, even speech that concerns core political or religious messages, or commen-
tary on social issues. First is where the speech would "materially and substantially"
disrupt the school, and second is where the speech would invade the rights of other
students.29' Either one of these problems might arise from an inappropriate manner
of speech, such as an overly loud student, in which case the school can easily restrict
the speech with few constitutional issues posed. But what Tinker is really about is
when the message itself causes disruption or harms other students. Although Tinker
establishes that the special characteristics of schools might permit such restrictions
even on core political speech, it is clear that such restrictions are constitutionally toler-
ated in only very limited circumstances. Nothing in the various Morse opinions sug-
gests that has changed.
Certainly the primary focus in Tinker and in lower court decisions applying Tinker
has been on its first prong, whether the message would "materially and substantially"
interfere with the operation of the school. Not surprisingly, schools often assert this
type of disturbance as the basis to restrict student speech, arguing that the message
will draw reactions and create turmoil within the school that will interfere with classes.
Lower courts, however, typically require a clear showing that the speech caused a
substantial disruption of school activities or a likelihood that such disruption will
occur.292 Although the school does not need to show that an actual disruption occurred,
it has to show that the speech "created more than an unsubstantiated fear or appre-
hension of such a disruption or interference. '293 As stated by the Third Circuit, this
"requires a specific and significant fear of disruption, not just some remote appre-
hension of disturbance. 294 Importantly, mere offense or even anger on the part of
other students is not enough, nor can school officials assume that disruption will occur
simply because the views expressed are unpopular.295
For that reason, lower courts have frequently rejected arguments that a particular
message would cause a "substantial interference" with school operations so as to justify
prohibiting the speech. For example, the court in Barber ex. rel. Barber v. Dearborn
Public Schools held that a student had a right to wear a t-shirt that displayed a picture
of George Bush with the words "International Terrorist. "296 The court noted that the
291 Id.; see Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1177 (9th
Cir. 2006) (labeling these the two prongs of Tinker), vacated as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
292 See, e.g., Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524,530 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
that wearing a button with the word "scab" during a teachers strike was not inherently disrup-
five); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 211 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Tinker requires a
specific and significant fear of disruption, not just some remote apprehension of disturbance.").
293 Barber ex rel. Barber v. Dearborn Pub. Sch., 286 F. Supp. 2d 847,856 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
294 Saxe, 240 F.3d at 211.
295 Id. at 215 ('The Supreme Court has held time and again, both within and outside of the
school context, that the mere fact that someone might take offense at the content of speech
is not sufficient justification for prohibiting it.").
296 286 F. Supp. 2d 847 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
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record offered little evidence that a disruption would occur, and the fear of a dis-
ruption was largely based on the belief that the ideas expressed were unpopular. 97
Moreover, the possibility that the school in question had a high percentage of Iraqi
students whose families had fled the Saddam Hussein regime, and thus were support-
ive of George Bush, was not enough by itself to assume a disruption would occur.298
The court noted that the tension between students who supported the war in Iraq and
those who opposed it was no greater than tensions in the Vietnam War when Tinker
was decided. 299
Similarly, in Chambers v. Babbitt, the court held that a student had a right to wear
a t-shirt with the words "straight pride" on it, despite offense taken by another student
and alleged safety concerns for the student wearing the shirt and others.3" To back
up these concerns, the school argued that there had been fights on the school grounds
over other incidents, and that the shirt in question was already generating divisions
within the student body. The court rejected these arguments, however, seeing no
connection between previous disturbances and the type of message in question.3"1
Moreover, the fact that some students were offended by what they perceived was an
intolerant message was not enough to justify a restriction:
Maintaining a school community of tolerance includes the toler-
ance of such viewpoints as expressed by "Straight Pride." While
the sentiment behind the "Straight Pride" message appears to be
one of intolerance, the responsibility remains with the school and
its community to maintain an environment open to diversity and
to educate and support its students as they confront ideas different
from their own. The Court does not disregard the laudable inten-
tion of Principal Babbitt to create a positive social and learning
environment by his decision, however, the constitutional impli-
cations and the difficult but rewarding educational opportunity
created by such diversity of view point are equally as important
and must prevail under the circumstances.3 2
Chambers and Barber are indicative of many lower court decisions applying the
Tinker substantial disruption standard, indicating that much more is required than
simply a message that creates offense, unrest, and potential controversy. 303 There
is certainly nothing in Morse that changes this. The majority in Morse characterized
297 Id. at 856-57.
298 Id. at 857.
299 Id.
'oo 145 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1069 (D. Minn. 2001).
30 Id. at 1072.
302 Id. at 1073.
303 See, e.g., Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972).
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Tinker as "implicating concerns at the heart of the First Amendment," which
required more than a "'desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint"' or a desire to avoid controversy.3 "4 As noted
earlier, Justice Alito in particular emphasized that the facts of Morse were a far cry
from those of Tinker. °5
To say that the Tinker "substantial interference" standard is difficult to meet is
not to say it is impossible, and at times very real concerns of a substantial interfer-
ence will justify restrictions on student speech. For example, in several cases courts
have held that schools can prohibit displays of the Confederate flag when racial ten-
sions in the school or prior racial disturbances create the possibility of disturbances.
In West v. Derby Unified School District, the Tenth Circuit held that a school can ban
racially divisive symbols, such as Confederate flags, where there has been a history
of racially motivated violence and where the policy is applied against all racially moti-
vated symbols.3" The fact that the Confederate flag itself was not the cause of past
problems was irrelevant, since the school was not required to wait until the flag itself
caused a problem.3" Similarly, in Melton v. Young, the Sixth Circuit held that a
school could prohibit a student wearing a jacket with a Confederate flag patch where
the school was recently integrated and had experienced significant tension, some of
which related to the Confederate flag.308
At the same time, other courts have held that the wearing of an offensive or highly
controversial symbol, such as a Confederate flag, does not in and of itself establish
the likelihood of a disturbance. In Castorina ex rel. Rewt v. Madison County School
Board, the Sixth Circuit held that a school could not prohibit students from wearing
t-shirts displaying Confederate flags unless it could be shown that there were pre-
vious altercations or disturbances resulting from the display of Confederate flags at
the school.3" The court rejected the idea that displaying the flag itself was inherently
disruptive.3t ° Similarly, in Bragg v. Swanson, a federal district court held that a school
could not punish a student for wearing a t-shirt displaying a Confederate flag unless
there was "'a well-founded expectation of disruption"' based on racial tensions at the
school or past incidents.3 ' The mere fact that many would associate the flag with
racism was not enough by itself to satisfy Tinker's "fear of disruption" standard.1 2
304 See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2626 (2007) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
305 Id. at 2637-38 (Alito, J., concurring).
'06 206 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 825 (2000).
307 Id. at 1366.
308 465 F.2d 1332, 1334-35 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973).
'09 246 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2001).
310 Id. at 544.
311 371 F. Supp. 2d 814, 822 (W.D. W.Va. 2005) (quoting Newsom ex rel. Newsom v.
Albemarle County Sch. Bd., 354 F.3d 249, 256 (4th Cir. 2003)).
312 Id. at 826-28. The court distinguished cases that held display of the Confederate flag
could be prohibited, stating, 'This case does not involve flag-based physical violence between
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These cases involving the Confederate flag reflect the basic principles outlined
above. In order for a school to restrict speech under Tinker's "substantial disruption"
prong there must be "a specific and significant fear of disruption," justified by the
particular circumstances of the school.3 13 The mere fact that a message is offensive
or controversial is not enough, by itself, to create a significant fear of disruption, nor
is the fact that school officials merely believe a disruption might occur enough. Rather,
school officials must show specific facts and circumstances at the school suggesting
a disruption might occur, such as pre-existing and significant tensions that in some
manner relate to the message, or previous disruptions from similar messages in the
past. However, officials need not wait until a particular message causes a disturbance
before it can be banned, nor must officials show that the same message was respon-
sible for disturbances in the past.
The second justification offered in Tinker for restricting student speech is where
the speech interferes with the rights of other students.314 The Court in Tinker was not
clear what this might mean, nor has there been many lower court decisions attempting
to apply it. Obviously speech that is unnecessarily loud and intrusive might not only
disrupt the educational process, but also interfere with other students attempts to
study or simply converse with other students, and can clearly be prohibited. Simi-
larly, speech that independently constitutes a tort, such as defamation or intentional
infliction of emotional distress, can be prohibited.
But this second prong of Tinker arguably goes beyond loud or tortious speech,
and also includes messages that might be considered excessively and psychologi-
cally harmful to people because it denigrates their core identity or the groups they
belong to. The Supreme Court has been clear, of course, that speech cannot be
prohibited merely because people disagree with it or find it offensive.315 This is true
in schools as well as elsewhere.316 Yet arguably some speech might go well beyond
offending others to the point of effectively constituting an expressive assault upon
people because of who they are or groups they belong to. This might be done by
direct and derogatory statements, or by symbols associated with hate speech, such
as burning crosses or swastikas. Either way, such speech might result in significant
psychological or emotional injury to some students, making it difficult to fully
students, a pervasive background of demonstrated racial hostility, or the involvement of any
hate groups aligned on either side of a serious racial divide." Id. at 827.
313 Id. at 822 (quoting Newsom, 354 F.3d at 256).
314 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
311 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that the First Amendment protects wearing a jacket
with profanity on the back even though some might be offended).
316 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 215 (3d
Cir. 2001).
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engage in school. This might be particularly true of vulnerable groups or those
historically subject to discrimination.
The few lower courts discussing this issue have differed in their attitude regard-
ing whether the Tinker "rights of others" prong can be used by schools to restrict
speech that might be viewed as attacking groups based on their identity. In Saxe v.
State College Area School District, the Third Circuit, in an opinion written by then-
Judge Alito, expressed some skepticism about whether Tinker could be stretched that
far.317 In that case the court was reviewing a school anti-harassment policy under the
First Amendment, primarily focusing on its validity under Fraser, Hazelwood, and
the "substantial disruption" prong of Tinker.318 Near the end of the opinion, the court
briefly reflected on whether speech creating a "hostile environment" under the policy
might be banned under Tinker's "intrudes upon the rights of others" language. The
court rejected that idea, stating:
Because the Policy's "hostile environment" prong does not, on its
face, require any threshold showing of severity or pervasiveness,
it could conceivably be applied to cover any speech about some
enumerated personal characteristics the content of which offends
someone. This could include much "core" political and religious
speech: the Policy's "Definitions" section lists as examples of
covered harassment "negative" or "derogatory" speech about such
contentious issues as "racial customs," "religious traditions,"
"language," "sexual orientation," and "values." Such speech,
when it does not pose a realistic threat of substantial disruption,
is within a students' First Amendment rights.319
Judge Alito's analysis strongly suggests that even derogatory and negative speech
that might comment on characteristics of a group identity is protected to the extent it
involves core religions or religious speech, or involves commentary on social issues.
The quote does suggest, though, that particularly severe or pervasive speech might
not be protected, an issue the court did not have to directly address since it was only
examining the policy facially. Thus, particularly egregious and severely derogatory
speech that concerns personal characteristics or group identity might not be protected,
even if the message relates to core speech. Nevertheless, the tone of the Alito opinion
in Saxe suggests that "the rights of others" prong of Tinker provides little basis to
restrict derogatory messages aimed at a group's characteristics.
In a very recent case, however, Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified School
District, the Ninth Circuit took a markedly different attitude regarding derogatory
317 240 F.3d 200.
318 Id. at 202.
319 Id. at 217.
20091 709
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
messages, even those based on core political or social commentary speech.32° In
that case a high school student was prohibited from wearing a t-shirt that read, "Be
ashamed, our school embraced what God has condemned" on the front, and "Homo-
sexuality is shameful" written on the back. The student wore the shirt in response
to a "Day of Silence" at the school, a program designed to promote greater tolerance
for gay and lesbian issues.32'
The Ninth Circuit held that the school could prohibit Harper from wearing the
shirt, holding that the shirt constituted speech that "impinge[d] on the rights of other
students" under Tinker.322 Holding that the shirt "'collide[d] with the rights of other
students in a most fundamental way,"' the court stated:
Public school students who may be injured by verbal assault on
the basis of a core identifying characteristic such as race, religion,
or sexual orientation, have a right to be free from such attacks
while on school campuses. As Tinker clearly states, students have
the right to "be secure and to be let alone." Being secure involves
not only freedom from physical assaults but from psychological
attacks that cause young people to question their self-worth and
their rightful place in society.323
The court was careful to limit its holding to the facts before it, stating, "We con-
sider here only whether schools may prohibit the wearing of T-shirts on high school
campuses and in high school classes that flaunt demeaning slogans, phrases or apho-
risms relating to a core characteristic of particularly vulnerable students and that may
cause them significant injury. "324 Thus, the court rejected the broader principle that
any derogatory statements aimed at individuals or groups could be prohibited, stating
that t-shirts saying, "Young Republicans Suck," or "Young Democrats Suck" would
be protected speech, since such messages would not be "sufficiently damaging to the
individual or to the educational process" to justify restrictions.325 Similarly, shirts
that demean the President or his policies would be protected. Rather, the decision
seemed to be limited to messages that denigrate other students based on core charac-
teristics of vulnerable students, or students that are members of a minority group.
3 26
Harper seems like a correct decision based on the "rights of others" prong of
Tinker, but it presents the obvious problem of how to draw lines. Although schools
320 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
321 Id. at 1170-73.
322 Id. at 1177-78.
323 Id. at 1178 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,508
(1969)).
324 Id. at 1182.
325 Id.
326 Id. at 1182 n.27.
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should be able to restrict speech that is particularly derogatory and demeaning toward
other students, especially those students who might be vulnerable, Tinker does not
justify restrictions on any core political or religious speech simply because it might
cause discomfort to particularly vulnerable students. For example, a student should
be able to wear a shirt stating opposition to same-sex marriage or gay rights, even
though that might suggest disapproval of homosexuality, a characteristic that goes to
the core of a vulnerable population. Similarly, shirts that oppose affirmative action,
immigration policy, and gender equality should be protected if communicated in
respectful ways. Perhaps coming closer to the issue, even a message expressing dis-
agreement with a "Day of Silence" program should be protected if properly stated,
notwithstanding the impact it might have on some students.
This highlights what is the real concern of the "rights of others" prong of Tinker,
which is the manner and words chosen to communicate ideas, and not necessarily the
ideas themselves. The words chosen to communicate an idea, of course, cannot be
completely separated from the idea itself, and thus to prohibit certain wording changes
to some degree the actual message. The Supreme Court made this point in Cohen v.
California, where it held that a person had a First Amendment right to wear a jacket
saying, "Fuck the Draft," since any other phrasing of opposition to the draft would
change the message. 27 Similarly, to tell a student he or she can voice opposition to
gay rights or to a tolerance program sponsored by the school, but must do so in a
respectful manner, is not the same message as "Homosexuality is shameful."
Yet that is arguably the trade-off that the special characteristics of schools permits
that is not permitted elsewhere. The need to ensure a safe and secure environment
for learning for all students justifies viewpoint modification of a message, such as in
Harper, even if it means the message is changed to some degree. Indeed, in Fraser
the Court stated that the jacket at issue in Cohen was protected in most contexts, but
could be prohibited inside a school.328 This represents the fundamental principle that
schools have the right to regulate the manner in which core political and religious
ideas are communicated. At the same time, however, they cannot prohibit expression
of the ideas themselves. Students clearly have the right to wear jackets and t-shirts at
school expressing opposition to the draft or gay rights, but the message must be com-
municated in a respectful manner. In particular, messages that might in some way
reflect on the characteristics of vulnerable groups are protected, but must be commu-
nicated in a non-derogatory manner.
This trade-off, in which schools can restrict viewpoint messages that invade the
rights of others but must allow the underlying viewpoint themselves to be protected,
is justified under the implicit balancing found in Morse. On the one hand, the view-
point restriction is a modest one, since students retain the right to voice sentiments
on political, religious, and social issues, but must do so in respectful manner. This
327 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
328 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
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changes the message to some extent, but nevertheless protects its core elements.
Conversely, a school's interest in protecting "the rights of other students" is a
substantial one, as noted in Tinker. Although forcing students to modify extremely
derogatory statements would not be permitted in other contexts, the special charac-
teristics of schools, and the balancing approach implicit in Morse, arguably justify
such a speech restriction.
It needs to be stressed, however, that these two justifications from Tinker that per-
mit viewpoint restrictions on core political, religious, and social commentary speech
are very narrow in their scope. The "substantial interference" prong of Tinker requires
clear facts indicating that the speech is likely to cause a disturbance, not simply "an
unsubstantiated fear or apprehension" of a disturbance, or an assumption that a dis-
turbance will occur because the views are unpopular. Similarly, the "invasion of
rights of others" prong requires particularly derogatory and demeaning messages
aimed at a person or group's personal characteristics, not merely messages that might
make some other students feel bad. Although the balancing implicit in Morse should
permit such narrowly drawn restrictions on core speech, for the most part the balanc-
ing suggested in Morse strongly indicates that core political, religious, and social com-
mentary speech is protected in schools, even if it offends others and is controversial.
CONCLUSION
Free speech in public schools is a complicated affair, and it remains so after
Morse v. Frederick. The twin pillars on which student speech jurisprudence is built,
respect for student rights while at the same time recognizing the unique needs and
characteristics of schools, inevitably leads to ambiguities and close cases. Moreover,
student speech in high schools is a multi-dimensional issue, at times calling for unique
analytical models when a limited public forum, school-sponsored speech, or a prior
restraint is involved. It is not surprising, therefore, that lower courts have often strug-
gled with how to approach student speech issues.
The Court's recent decision in Morse, though quite limited in scope, nevertheless
sheds some light on student speech jurisprudence and how courts should approach
student speech issues. Most significantly, what emerges from Morse is a balancing
approach to most high school speech issues, in which a court examines the type of
restriction, the nature of speech, and the importance of the school interest. As a prac-
tical matter, this appears to be a reasonable accommodation of the dual concerns first
recognized in Tinker and affirmed in subsequent cases, in which student speech inter-
ests are recognized but are nevertheless tailored to the special needs and characteristics
of schools.
For that reason, concerns that Morse reflects a further erosion of student speech
rights are largely overstated. To be sure, Morse continues the trend of Supreme Court
decisions after Tinker in which school interests seemingly always trump student
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speech interests. And the balancing implicit in Morse might give courts greater lati-
tude to do that in the future. But the majority opinion in Morse was careful to dis-
tinguish the speech in that case from what it labeled core political and religious speech,
implying significant protection for such speech at the core of the First Amendment.
This was even more clear in Justice Alito' s critical concurring opinion, where he left
no doubt that Morse was a very narrow decision, and that political speech and social
commentary speech in school would be given significant protection. Taken together,
these opinions reflect a strong sentiment to protect student speech perceived to be
at the heart of the First Amendment.
Where the Morse balancing approach takes student speech rights is yet to be seen.
Yet if the Justices are true to their word, core political, religious, and social com-
mentary speech that happens to occur on school property should be highly protected,
subject to only very real threats of disruption or harm to other students. This will be
a difficult standard to meet, as lower court decisions have consistently shown. But
speech less central to the First Amendment, though still protected, will be subject to
greater restrictions when significant school interests exist. Although this might be
troubling to some, balancing in this manner permits courts to be sensitive to the pri-
mary educational purpose of schools while at the same time protecting student speech
rights where they are most threatened.
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